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Summary 
 
 
 
Our study analyses how corruption affects the equity entry modes when MNEs 
invest in emerging markets. Using the framework developed by Hill et al. (1990), 
we hypothesize that corruption will be a significant determinant of the entry mode 
decision on its own; moreover, we suggest that the industry’s likelihood of bribing 
and the technological sophistication of the company are predictors for the entry 
mode as well. 
 
Few studies have properly investigated if corruption influences the entry mode 
decision of an MNE.The prior research on the topic has focused mainly on a 
limited number of industries if investigating in multiple countries. Furthermore, 
we look into several industries from the infrastructure sector, which is 
characterized by a high government involvement, to better assess any possible 
differences between one industry and another. 
  
After gathering and analyzing data from 559 investment projects in 31 emerging 
markets, we conclude that although corruption and the technological 
sophistication level are not significant, contrary to prior research, the industry’s 
likelihood of bribing is. We also argue for the significance of other variables, 
since we believe they are somewhat embedded in the corruption-entry modes 
relationship.   
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1. Introduction 
 
International capital flows have reshaped the whole international economic 
landscape in the last two decades. Accordingly, in the field of international 
business, the question regarding the choice of international entry modes has 
attracted a lot of attention from researchers. That can be easily explained if we 
think that, first of all, entry modes is one of the crucial concepts that is part of the 
internationalization process of firms, and secondly, it is one of the most critical 
decisions a company can make (Andersen, 1997). Thus, it is important to 
acknowledge that entry mode decisions are difficult and costly to reverse. 
Moreover, they influence the level of resource commitment, risk and control, and 
affect at the same time the firm’s performance (Hill et al. 1990; Uhlenbruck et al. 
2006). 
 
On the other hand, corruption is known to have a significant impact on the 
economy as a whole, as well as on firms. Because of the globalization process that 
increasingly interconnects markets and countries, companies are more likely to 
engage in corrupt practices. However, there are only a handful of studies that 
question the way firms respond and deal with corruption when entering a foreign 
market (Wei and Smarzynska, 2000; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006, Javorcik and Wei, 
2009). Earlier research shows that firms from industrialized countries have a 
tendency to choose Joint Ventures (JV) over Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) 
when they choose an equity entry mode in emerging markets with high levels of 
corruption. However, the research conducted in the area has mainly focused on 
MNEs from developed countries, and is mostly restricted to emerging countries in 
Asia, Europe or the former Soviet Union. It is also important to note that prior 
research focuses in most cases on one industry only, when researched in multiple 
countries. As such, throughout the paper, we want to investigate how companies 
from developed and emerging countries adapt to the corrupt environments of 31 
emerging markets when investing there, through their equity entry mode strategy, 
by focusing on six different industries in the infrastructure sector. 
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We look at equity investments only, because we know from the prior literature 
that corruption in general has a negative effect on foreign equity investments, and 
so, we want to see what entry mode do MNEs prefer when they do decide to make 
an equity investment.  We believe that the best approach is to discuss several 
industries, in order to be able to better assess the differences that might exist 
between the various branches of the economy, since we expect to find notable 
discrepancies. We also believe that focusing on emerging markets presents real 
interest to the business community, since such states have attracted a large amount 
of equity investments the last decades, are expected to grow further (Cavusgil et 
al. 2008; Ranjan, 2011; World Bank, 2010), and in addition score high on 
corruption (Transparency International, 2011).  
  
Thus, we consider that the paper will positively contribute to the limited number 
of studies that examine the relationship between MNE’s entry modes and host 
country corruption, since our research will focus on dynamic countries that 
present real opportunities for investors and companies. Additionally, we will 
contribute to the literature of entry modes by strengthening the theory further, or 
proving it wrong.   
          
The thesis will be structured in the following way. In the next section, a 
theoretical description of the companies’ entry modes and corruption concepts 
will be provided, followed by a comprehensive literature review concerning the 
relationship between corruption and the choice of entry modes. Moreover, Hill et 
al.’s (1990) framework regarding the choice of entry modes will be our 
cornerstone for the development of the hypotheses. In the methodology section we 
will describe how the research was conducted and what variables we included. 
Following on from this, we analyse the data and discuss our results. In conclusion, 
limitations, potential implications of the study, and further research topics will be 
suggested. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Foreign Investments and Entry Modes 
 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs), the main agent of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), bring their know-how, as well as capital, to host countries in the process of 
managing their overseas operations and assets (Nam, 2011). When a firm decides 
to invest abroad, the important decision regarding which entry mode strategy to 
choose, needs to be taken. Entry mode strategies affect the foreign subsidiary’s 
likelihood of success and its probability of survival in a new market (Delios and 
Beamish, 1999). 
Previous research 
points out that entry 
modes, once 
established, are 
difficult to change, 
since in many cases 
the associated costs 
would be significant 
(Pedersen et al., 
2002). Therefore, it is 
very important for 
MNE’s to identify the 
appropriate entry 
mode when investing abroad.  
 
According to Pan and Tse (2000) (Figure 1), entry modes can be seen as a 
hierarchical model, where the firm first takes a decision between non-equity and 
equity, and then takes a further decision as to which specific mode within the 
equity or non-equity mode to adopt. The equity-based entry modes include wholly 
owned subsidiaries (WOS) and joint ventures (JV), while the non-equity-based 
entry modes include contractual agreements and export operations. Hennart 
(2000) also classifies modes of entry in two main categories: contracts and equity, 
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positioning JVs and WOSs in the latter one. For him, the main difference between 
the two consists of the method chosen to remunerate input providers.  
 
Throughout our paper we will focus on the equity entry modes only, namely joint 
ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries, which represent the main means by 
which multinational enterprises operate internationally (Young et al., 1989). A 
joint venture we define as “the sharing of assets, risks and profits, and 
participation in the ownership of a particular enterprise or investment project by 
more than one firm or economic group defined as corporations, public 
corporations or government.” (p. 17-18). While partners’ relative shareholdings 
are commonly split 50/50 or 51/49, any distribution of shares is possible in what 
may be characterized minority or majority-owned joint ventures (Young et al., 
1989). MNEs prefer joint ventures partnerships with local firms to other FDI 
arrangements when they enter emerging markets where substantial risk and 
uncertainty exist (Nam, 2011). Wholly owned subsidiary, on the other hand, is 
defined as a 100% ownership of a subsidiary, and are associated with strategies 
that require high control (e.g. global strategy, or when protecting proprietary 
rights are vital), or when implementation of policies from the headquarter is 
required in order to survive or grow in more competitive markets (Young et al., 
1989).  
 
Following, we are going to introduce a framework that we believe best explains 
the entry mode decision, and afterwards, we are going to thoroughly focus on 
equity entry modes. 
2.1.1. Choice of Market Entry Modes: Theories and Conceptual 
Frameworks 
 
The choice of entry modes is influenced by different types of factors, which 
according to Pan and Tse (2000), include firm-specific, industry specific, and 
country-specific factors. As such, a large number of theories have been advanced 
to explain what affects the entry mode choice decision, some being more 
comprehensive than others. Among the most commonly applied are transaction 
cost analysis (Williamson, 1985), the resource-based view (Luo, 2002; Tsang, 
2000; Barney, 1991), institutional theory (Peng et al., 2008; K. D. Brouthers, 
 6 
2002) and Dunning’s Eclectic Framework (Dunning, 2000), which is based on the 
previously mentioned theories (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). Additionally, Hill 
et al. (1990) have further developed Dunning’s eclectic framework, by taking into 
consideration strategic variables as well (Andersen, 1997). As such, for the 
purpose of our research we are going to use and to present thoroughly Hill et al.’s 
framework (1990), since we believe it is easy to understand, and perhaps the most 
comprehensive one.  
 
According to Hill et al. (1990), entry modes are characterized by different levels 
of control, resource commitment and dissemination risk. The level of control 
is defined as the influence over operational and strategic decision-making. In our 
case, for the equity operating modes, the lowest level of control is found in joint 
ventures, where it depends on the ownership split and the number of partners. In 
contrast, the highest level of control is found in wholly owned subsidiaries, where 
control of the daily activities could be delegated to the foreign subsidiary, but 
always, the final decision can be taken by the corporate office (Hill et al., 1990). 
A certain level of resource commitment is also required for each entry mode. 
The level of resource commitment represents the devoted assets that cannot be 
reorganized later to alternative uses without cost. The assets may be tangible, such 
as a physical plant, or intangible, such as know-how. In the case of a wholly 
owned subsidiary, the MNE has to bear all the costs of starting up and running the 
new operation, while in the joint venture this depends on the ownership split. Here 
it is also important to note that resource commitment may act as an exit barrier, 
and thus limit the flexibility of the firm (Hill et al., 1990). Therefore, in the case 
of high resource commitment an MNE cannot exit a foreign market without 
incurring sunk costs. Accordingly we can see that the strategic flexibility is 
greater in the case of a JV, than in the case of a WOS. Finally, the dissemination 
risk refers to the risk that firm specific advantages in know-how will be 
expropriated. This risk is higher in non-equity and in joint venture partnerships 
(Hill et al., 1990), and it is at its lowest in the case of wholly owned subsidiaries. 
It is important to note that in the case of a JV, greater control over the firm-
specific know-how has the party with the higher stake.  
 
A summary of how the levels of control, resource commitment and dissemination 
risk vary for equity entry modes, can be seen in the following table (Table 2a):  
 7 
 
Entry Mode Control Resource Commitment Dissemination Risk 
Joint Venture Medium Medium Medium 
Wholly Owned Subsidiary High High Low 
Table 2a 
Accordingly, from the table we can see that if a company chooses to enter a 
market using a JV, it will have a medium level of control, resource commitment 
and dissemination risk. This means that the control and level of resource 
commitment are shared among partners, but at the same time the firm is more 
flexible than a WOS, and in case of difficulties it can divest more easily. 
Moreover, it is important to notice that the dissemination risk of firm specific 
know-how is much higher in the case of JVs, than in the case of WOSs.   
 
Furthermore, the authors of the model believe that the elements said to have an 
influence on entry mode choice are strategic, environmental, and transaction 
specific variables. According to Hill et al. (1990), strategic variables influence the 
entry mode through the control requirements they bring along. Basically, different 
strategies call for different levels of control, and naturally, different entry modes. 
On the other hand, the environmental variables have an influence on the resource 
commitment level, and implicitly affect the strategic flexibility of the operation. 
Last but not least, the transaction specific variables affect the dissemination risks 
and the level of control, calling in the end for one or another entry mode.  
 
Strategic variables 
In the case of strategic variables, the main decision an MNE has to make is related 
to the use of a global, or a multi-domestic strategy, since they both entail different 
levels of control. Here we have to acknowledge that a multi-domestic strategy 
considers that national markets are very different in terms of consumer tastes and 
preferences, together with competitive conditions, political, legal and social 
structures (Hill et al., 1990). Accordingly, operating responsibilities will be given 
to the subsidiaries, which have considerable autonomy. Therefore, in the case of a 
multi-domestic strategy, a low degree of control is required (such as a JV in the 
case of equity investments).  
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On the other hand, because of the globalization phenomena, a convergence of 
tastes and preferences can clearly be seen (Cavusgil et al., 2008). Consequently, 
MNE’s have the opportunity to realize economies of scale by adopting a global 
strategy, where operations (such as production and marketing) are standardized. 
Because national subsidiaries usually specialize in this case in the production of 
only one part of the product line, coordination between the various subsidiaries is 
important, and so, a high degree of control seems to be the solution. As we can 
see, a wholly owned subsidiary is more likely to be adopted, in the detriment of a 
joint venture.  
 
Furthermore, Hill et al. (1990) discuss what they call a global oligopoly: basically 
an industry with a limited number of players that have considerable power. In this 
situation, as Hill et al. (1990) argue, the strategy of the national operations has to 
be controlled by the corporate office. As such, the national subsidiaries have to 
accept imposed strategies, and in some cases might also be forced to run at a loss, 
just for the greater good of the whole company (for instance in cases where a 
company enters a rival’s home country, just to keep the rival busy in protecting its 
home market). Therefore, it can be concluded that a wholly owned subsidiary will 
be preferred, since it is unlikely that a partner (in the case of a JV) will accept all 
of the above mentioned “conditions”. 
 
Environmental variables 
Environmental variables include exogenous factors such as country risk and 
location familiarity, together with demand and competitive conditions in the host 
country, which have a significant impact upon the levels of resource commitment 
and strategic flexibility. 
 
Country risk generally includes political risk (ex. government intervention, 
instability of political system), ownership/control risks (ex. expropriation, 
intervention), operations risk (ex. price control, local content requirements, 
bureaucracy, red tape, administrative delays and corruption), and transfer risk (ex. 
currency inconvertibility risk, remittance control) (Hill et al. 1990; Cavusgil et al. 
2008). In the cases when these risks are at a high level, the firms should have 
increased flexibility so that they can exit the market fast, with low losses. This 
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translates as a low resource commitment approach, and so, we can argue that a JV 
will be favored to a WOS. 
 
Location familiarity represents the perceived distance between the home and host 
countries in terms of cultural aspects and business practices. As we will see later 
on in our paper, previous studies have considered the “distance” between home 
and host countries, and have reached several conclusions. 
  
Demand conditions according to Hill et al. (1990), influence the resource 
commitments an MNE is willing to make. When the demand in a host country is 
unknown, MNEs might favor low resource commitment modes, such as JVs, in 
the case of equity investments. But according to the authors of the model, when 
demand is more stable, it does not necessarily mean that the firms will favor one 
entry mode, or another. 
 
Competitive conditions also have an influence on the entry mode choice. The 
authors of the framework is a situation of volatile competition, firms need to 
respond as quickly as possible. Thus, because high resource commitments limit 
flexibility, MNEs could favor entry modes such as JVs (in the case of equity 
investments). 
 
Transactions specific variables 
Lastly, transaction-specific variables take into account the value of firm specific 
know-how, together with the tacit nature of this knowledge, thus being related to 
the level of dissemination risk (Hill et al. 1990). Accordingly, in cases of 
inexistent transaction costs, firms will favor low resource commitment 
investments. But in real life situations, there always exists the risk of 
disseminating proprietary know-how to a partner (of the joint venture for 
instance). Very important to consider here are the quasi-rents that can be earned 
from the firms’ know-how. Hill et al. (1990) suggest that the greater these quasi-
rents are, the more likely the MNE will favor an entry mode, which minimizes 
dissemination risk.  
 
Additionally, the nature of know-how is also discussed. In most cases, a 
company’s proprietary know-how, is being embedded in its human capital and 
 10 
routines. Therefore, transferring it to a partner might be very difficult to 
accomplish and to quantify. Consequently, entering a new market through a 
wholly owned subsidiary seems to be the appropriate solution.  
 
An overview of the developed model can be seen in the figure below (Figure 2):  
 
Figure 2: Hill et al.’s eclectic framework (1990) 
 
From the model we can draw the conclusion that there are many factors and 
elements affecting the choice of entry mode for the firm, which have to be 
thoroughly considered. We will further use the framework for our research paper, 
specifically for making assumptions about possible relationships and developing 
hypotheses. Moreover, we will mainly concentrate on one of the framework’s 
elements, namely the country risk environmental variable, which encompasses our 
next important concept, specifically corruption.  
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2.2. Country Risk: Corruption 
 
Another important concept in our paper is the corruption level of each country, 
which is positioned under the country risk strategic variable in Hill et al.’s 
framework (1990), and is also considered by Pan and Tse (2000) in their country 
risk analysis.  
 
Corruption has received significant attention among economists and international 
financial institutions during the last few decades, given its implications for 
economic growth. The importance of corruption comes from the fact that it has 
the ability to influence the roots of an economy. For instance, it can erode 
property rights, restrain political institutions and threaten democracy together with 
the social, economic and political benefits that come with it. In support of the 
facts presented above, the World Bank President, James D. Wolfensohn, refers to 
corruption as a cancer, in his 1996 speech at the Annual Meetings of the World 
Bank and IMF, considering that corruption is “among the greatest obstacles to 
economic and social development” (Calhoun, 2011). 
 
The concept is especially discussed in emerging markets, where the absence of 
strong formal institutions is conspicuous (Jiang et al. 2008; Demirbag et al. 2010) 
and the foreign equity investment is a rapid and unforeseen incoming cash flow 
that may surpass the speed of political and economic reform in these economies. 
This causes a gap between the new laws and legal system on one hand, and the 
reality of the local culture and people's awareness, on the other, and therefore 
creates an increase in corruption (Sato, 2009).  
  
Throughout the literature about corruption, scholars find different classifications 
for corruption. In this sense, corruption can be separated into (i) grand corruption, 
which refers to situations where the political elite exploit their power for 
economic gain, for example where elected politicians allocate contracts or 
subsidies to the firms that provide them with an adequate bribe; (ii) bureaucratic 
corruption, which refers to bureaucrats who accept small bribes in exchange for 
releasing permits (also known as petty corruption); (iii) legislative corruption, 
which refers to the extent to which the voting behavior of legislators can be 
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influenced. Corruption may also occur in daily business life without direct 
intervention from public agents. In most instances these categories are 
interrelated; if the government is corrupt, it is likely that lower instances are too 
(Kain, 2001; Elliot, 1997). 
  
Then, there is another important classification of corruption. Doh et al. (2003), 
argue that there is pervasive corruption (corruption that is certain and 
widespread) and arbitrary corruption (corruption that is uncertain). Both types 
of corruption have been seen as deterrents to FDI. However, in emerging 
economies, compared to developed, arbitrary corruption does not act as a 
deterrent because it simply creates higher uncertainty in the investment; but this 
uncertainty is already there in the emerging economies, since such countries have 
unclear rules about governing business operations, or simply put are characterized 
by a turbulent environment.  
  
Additionally, one of the most popular views is that corruption can be seen as a tax 
that increases the costs of stakeholders. As such, Ali Al-Sadig (2009) considers 
that corruption can take various forms such as bribery, extortion, influence, fraud 
and embezzlement, but throughout its research chooses to see corruption as an 
“arrangement” that involves “a private exchange between two parties which (1) 
has an influence on the allocation of resources either immediately or in the future, 
and (2) involves the use or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private 
ends (Macrae, 1982)”. 
 
Furthermore, there has been a strong debate in the literature regarding the 
usefulness of corruption. Therefore, there are two main currents regarding the 
connection between corruption and economic growth. One of them, states that 
corruption acts like grease to wheels, facilitating the economic growth, and 
helping government officials to make the process of project approval more 
efficient (Leff, 1964; Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998). For instance, in emerging 
economies, corruption enables the replication of the market mechanisms that are 
absent in situations of excessive or poorly designed regulation (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008). In fact, in a business survey, Søreide (2007) found that Norwegian 
companies were willing to “adjust to the local business culture” if contracts were 
lost because competitors had offered bribes. Firms that value time or access to 
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goods more highly than others will pay the officials a bribe for such access. As a 
result, corruption in emerging economies will act as grease to facilitate 
transactions (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Other researchers support this by arguing 
that bribery may be an efficient way of circumventing regulations and inefficient 
legal systems and may, in fact, help foreign investors to enter a market (Svaleryd 
et al. 2008). This stream of literature has only received partial support, and is 
more directed towards narrow areas of interest, such as the help of entrepreneurs 
in their start-up phase, or agents that are willing to pay bribes for property rights 
in environments that lack sufficient institutions. The second current argues that 
corruption can be seen as sand to the wheels, by impeding economic growth, 
because it increases the cost of doing business and introduces uncertainty in the 
decision making process. The proponents of this view include Mauro (1995), Mo 
(2001), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Wei (2000a). From this point of view, it is 
necessary for firms to devote human and financial resources in order to manage 
bribes, although these resources could be invested more profitably in other uses. 
Additionally, as pointed out by Krueger (1993), instead of speeding up 
procedures, corrupt officials actually have an incentive to cause greater 
administrative delays in order to attract more bribes.  
  
As we can see, there are many definitions and opinions regarding corruption, 
some more narrow than others. Consequently, for the purpose of this study we 
have decided to adopt a broader perspective, and used Transparency 
International’s definition: “Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain” (Transparency International, 2011). Thus, by accepting this view, we 
perceive corruption as sand to the wheels, considering that it will cause more 
harm than good in the long term. 
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2.3.  Corruptions’ Influence on the Entry Mode 
Strategy 
 
     The impact on corruption on international business did not occur as a separate 
topic for empirical studies before the 1990s. Earlier, corruption was implicitly 
combined with other elements in the merged index of political stability (Habib 
and Zurawicki, 2010). But later on, due to its importance, as we will see in the 
following paragraphs, the relationship between corruption and entry modes has 
been studied by various scholars, reaching different results.   
 
In terms of managerial implications, foreign investors can either choose to stay 
away from corrupt environments, or adapt accordingly. But once they decide to 
enter a corrupt country, apart from allocating the responsibility for bribery to 
independent agents (Bray, 2004), foreign investors can benefit from different 
forms of partnerships with local businesses more skilled in dealing with 
corruption (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002), since corruption makes achieving local 
licenses and permits more costly for foreign investors. Therefore, having a local 
partner can lower the transaction cost, and so a joint venture may seem the natural 
choice. However, it is important to acknowledge that, at the same time, sharing 
the ownership may cause leakage of technology, which can be a real problem in a 
corrupt and turbulent environment (Javorcik and Wei, 2009). 
  
   Wei and Smarzynska (2000) focused on the impact of corruption when investing 
in a host country, on the foreign investors' choice between a joint venture, and a 
wholly owned subsidiary in emerging countries (Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union). The dataset the studies used was a firm-level dataset, and they 
gathered information from questionnaires. They found that corruption shifts the 
ownership structure towards joint ventures. Nevertheless, the more 
technologically sophisticated the company was, the more the preference moved 
away from joint ventures, towards wholly owned subsidiaries in a corrupt country, 
(probably) to avoid the dissemination risk of technology and know-how. As an 
exception, US investors in similar companies were found to be more willing to 
make use of joint ventures in corrupt countries than investors of other 
nationalities. The authors wonder if this could happen because there is a strict 
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legislation in the US on corruption practices done abroad, and so, in the case of 
joint ventures the local partner could take responsibility for the “bureaucratic” 
aspects of the business (Wei and Smarzynska, 2000). 
  
   Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) focused explicitly on the telecommunications industry in 
64 emerging and developing economies and investigated how different types of 
corruption affected the firms’ entry mode choices. The authors suggest the firms 
enter via short-term contracts or via joint ventures in corrupt markets. Firms 
shifted the preference from wholly owned investment projects towards joint 
ventures and then further to non-equity forms of operation.  Thus, firms that 
entered via equity modes preferred JVs to WOSs in corrupt environments, but 
only where the arbitrariness associated with corruption was high. Arbitrariness 
reflects the degree of uncertainty and unpredictability associated with public 
sector corruption; while pervasiveness of corruption reflects the degree to which 
corruption is spread broadly throughout the public sector in a country. The authors 
identified arbitrariness, as a significant factor that increased the likelihood of 
firms (entering via equity entry modes), to engage in joint ventures, to overcome 
the problems connected with managing a foreign subsidiary in a corrupt host 
country. The results regarding pervasiveness suggested that this dimension of 
corruption represents not just another tax on entry, but is also an environmental 
threat to firms. 
 
     Tekin-Koru (2006) collected data on inward FDI in Turkey, originating from 88 
countries between 1990 and 2000, attempting to find an answer to the question of 
whether corruption had an influence on the entry mode choice or not. The scholar 
used a number of different specifications for corruption, and found that as the 
difference between developed countries’ level of corruption and the receiving 
countries’ level of corruption widened, the number of WOSs increased and the 
level of JVs declined, the latter being the only significant one. They concluded 
with the opposite of Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) and Wei and Smarzynska (2000), 
namely that corruption influenced firms to choose WOS in more corrupt 
environments.   
  
Later, Javorcik and Wei (2009) investigated how foreign direct investment and its 
ownership structure were affected by the degree of corruption. They researched 
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investments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and investigated the 
manufacturing industry there. They found that the likelihood of foreign 
investment taking place is negatively related to the degree of corruption in a host 
country. Additionally, they argued that corruption shifts the ownership structure 
towards joint ventures. The latter finding supports the view that corruption 
increases the value of using a local partner to cut through the bureaucratic maze. 
However, R&D intensive firms are found to favor sole ownership. 
 
Demirbag et al. (2009) looked at the FDI conducted by Turkey in other emerging 
economies of the Central Asian Republics. They investigated this because there 
already is an established literature on internationalization and entry mode choice 
of developed country MNEs to emerging countries (Brouthers and Hennart, 
2007), while the behavior of emerging country MNEs when investing in other 
emerging countries is less investigated (Demirbag et al. 2009). They used primary 
data at firm level, gathered from questionnaires. The findings showed that the 
entry modes an emerging economy (Turkey) used, in a corrupt environment, were 
mostly joint ventures. There was a strong correlation between the perceived risk 
of intervention, particularly bribery, and joint venture as an entry mode strategy. 
They argued that selecting a joint venture over a wholly owned subsidiary would 
allow the investor to avoid or minimize the risk of corruption.  
 
These studies that analyze the relationship between corruption and its impact on 
MNEs’ choice of entry mode, included multiple industries and focused mainly on 
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union (Wei and Smarzynska, 2000; Javorcik 
and Wei, 2009) and Asia (Demirbag et al. 2009), or took a general overview 
based on a cross country composition, in only one industry (Uhlenbruck et al., 
2006). In our study we have adopted a cross-country composition, by focusing on 
30 emerging countries; additionally, the equity investments are conducted by 
MNEs from both developed and emerging countries; moreover we consider 
multiple industries as well. 
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3. Hypotheses 
 
From the previous chapters we can see that corruption influences the entry mode 
choice of companies. Therefore, we would like to test some of the previous 
theories and researches, using multiple industries and countries in our sample, and 
in that way contribute with possibly more generalizability in the field of 
corruption and entry modes. As such, for the development of our hypotheses we 
have used the Hill et al.’s (1990) framework to predict which types of equity entry 
modes a firm might choose in a corrupt environment. The framework combines 
different elements that are considered to affect the choice of entry mode, and we 
believe this gives us a good overview of the entry mode decision into our chosen 
countries.   
3.1. Hypotheses Development  
 
Several authors suggest that some industry sectors are more subject to 
international corruption than others (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Zurawicki and Habib, 
2010). In the survey “Bribe Payers Survey 2011”, which looks at the likelihood of 
firms in 19 sectors to engage in bribery, sectors such as contracts and 
construction, real estate and property development, oil and gas, heavy 
manufacturing, and mining were the ones seen to bribe officials most frequently. 
The cleanest sectors, in terms of bribery of public officials, were identified as 
information technology, fisheries, and banking and finance (Transparency 
International, 2011). 
 
Therefore, given the different corruption levels from various sectors, and the 
influence that corruption could have on the entry mode choice of companies, we 
believe that firms’ entry modes will be differently affected by corruption, 
according to the industry where they are making the investment. In other words, if 
a firm is planning to invest in a foreign emerging country, in a certain industry 
where companies are more likely to engage in corrupt practices, we believe that 
firms will generally be more prone to use a lower commitment entry mode, such 
as a JV. Although, as we can see from the previous chapter, not all authors agree 
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on the choice of JV in a corrupt country, we are inclined to consider that in such 
cases, having a partner can be truly beneficial. There could be important cultural 
differences, different business practices and it could be close to impossible for 
some foreign firms to navigate through the bureaucratic maze, without local 
knowledge (especially if the firms come from developed nations, with lower 
corruption levels). Moreover, since we are discussing a turbulent environment, we 
can see from Hill et al.’s framework (1990) that it is easier to divest from a market 
in the case of a venture, as opposed to an owned subsidiary. Additionally, by 
conducting our analysis in multiple emerging countries, we will be able to see if 
there are any notable discrepancies, between them, or not.  
 
Therefore, if we consider the industry’s likelihood to bribe (as mentioned before, 
we refer to the companies’ likelihood to bribe from a specific sector), as a 
moderator variable between corruption and entry modes, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Foreign companies investing in industries with higher likelihood of 
bribing, in countries high on corruption, will choose JV as an entry mode.  
 
For the development of our second hypothesis, we will consider the technological 
sophistication of the investing company. From our previous literature review 
regarding corruption and entry modes, we can see that in general, corruption 
determines companies to rely on joint ventures, instead of wholly owned 
subsidiaries (Wei and Smarzynska, 2000). Using local partners simplifies the 
process of achieving all the necessary licenses and permits; however at the same 
time, this can lead to a dissemination of technology and know-how (Javorcik and 
Wei, 2009) Therefore, we believe that the transaction variables from Hill et al.’s 
framework (1990) are important to consider when discussing technology 
sophistication. Firms from industries with high technology hold firm-specific 
knowledge, which could be their main ownership advantage. Accordingly, they 
need to protect it against dissemination risk, and so, a high ownership and control 
structure is preferred. In line with the previous statement, we can see from 
previous research that the more technologically sophisticated a company is, the 
more it tries to avoid joint ventures (Javorcik and Wei, 2009; Wei and 
Smarzynska, 2000; Hill et al. 1990). 
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As discussed before, it is still important to have a local partner in a turbulent 
environment, but since emerging markets are usually characterized by instability 
and a lack of a clear and comprehensive legislation, keeping safe the know-how 
prevails.   
 
Therefore, if we consider company technological sophistication as moderator 
variables between corruption and entry modes, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: Foreign companies characterized by a high level of technological 
sophistication (R&D), investing in countries high on corruption, will adopt a 
WOS entry mode. 
 
3.2. Control Variables for Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
Additionally, for both our hypothesis we will include other variables as well, 
which could have a significant influence upon the relationship between corruption 
and entry modes. All these variables, together with their effect, will be presented 
in the following part of the paper. 
 
3.2.1. Cultural Distance 
 
Culture is defined by Hofstede (2001) as ‘the collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one human group from another’ (p. 21). Most 
people in the same culture carry the same values (Hennart and Larimo, 1998). The 
cultural distance between a home and a host country is suggested to have an 
influence on the firms’ internationalization strategy and their entry mode 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Hennart, 1988). However, earlier studies focusing 
on the relationship between equity entry modes and cultural distance show 
contradicting results. While some studies find that in cases with high cultural 
distance the firms show a preference towards WOSs, due to the risk and 
uncertainty of cooperating with local partners (Sim and Pandian, 2003; Mulok, 
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2010; Chang et al. 2012), some do not find any significant relationship between 
cultural distance and entry mode choice (Tihany et al. 2005), while others suggest 
the total opposite: that firms will choose JVs in countries exhibiting large cultural 
distance. They argue that the uncertainty increases the cost, and sharing the cost 
with a partner reduces the risk, and in addition a local partner could be more 
useful in an unfamiliar environment (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001; Hennart and 
Larimo, 1998: Kogut and Singh, 1988; Erramilli and Rao, 1993). Interestingly 
though, the latest studies tend to conclude with the WOS choice.  
 
From the ideas presented above we believe that cultural distance between states 
could bring along higher or lower commitments from investing companies 
(Kirkman et al. 2006), which translates in more WOSs or JVs. Accordingly, we 
choose to control for it, in this way avoiding any possible biased results.   
 
3.2.2. Openness to Trade  
 
Another important aspect to take into account is represented by the restrictions on 
foreign investments, which can certainly affect the entry modes of companies. In a 
country with an open economy, there should be no constraints on the flow of 
investment capital. Both the firms and individuals should be allowed to move and 
invest, as they consider appropriate, without restriction. Unfortunately, in practice, 
most countries have plenty of restrictions on investment. In some cases, they have 
different rules for foreign and domestic investment; some restrict access to foreign 
exchange; some impose restrictions on payments, transfers, and capital 
transactions; in some, certain industries are closed to foreign investment (Heritage 
Foundation, 2011). In our case, we are mainly interested in the restrictions against 
foreign equity investments, countries adopt either in all sectors or in particular 
ones. Most of the times, equity investments in collaboration with a local partner 
are accepted, thus rendering the joint venture the only feasible approach.  
In order to measure these formal restrictions, we have gathered data from the 
Heritage Foundation’s annual Index of Economic Freedom (2011), and we have 
labeled our variable openness to trade.  
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3.2.3. Home country legislation - United States and United 
Kingdom (from year 2010) 
 
It is important to note that even though corruption is illegal in every country, laws 
against bribery acts done in foreign countries, are a relatively new phenomenon 
(Søreide, 2007). In this respect, some of the toughest anti-corruption legislations 
in the world, are found in the United States (law from 1977), and in the United 
Kingdom (law from 2010) (Buchanan, 2011; Baker & McKenzie, 2010; Roberts, 
2011). The principle that states it is illegal to bribe foreign officials was first 
established in the US Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and since then, 
similar principles have gained legal standing in the United Kingdom.  
 
Due to these laws, US investors in companies high on technological sophistication 
were found to be more prone to choose joint ventures in corrupt countries than 
investors of other nationalities, which contradicts the results Wei and Smarzynska 
found in 2000, where firms high on technological sophistication normally would 
choose WOS. Moreover, we believe that the same outcome can be identified in 
firms from the UK investing after 2010 as well. Thus, we will control for the 
cases where the investing firm is either American or British, but only for the 
projects starting from 2010, or later in the case of British firms (as mentioned 
before, the law was adopted in the UK in 2010).  
 
3.2.4. Home Country Corruption 
 
Hill et al.’s (1990) framework takes into account strategic, environmental, and 
transaction variables regarding the firm and the host country. Nevertheless, factors 
concerning the home country are not considered. Moreover, in some cases, it is 
not corruption as such which acts as a barrier to FDI, but the risk of being 
punished if the briber is exposed by the home country authorities (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2010). According to GIACC/TI (2008) individuals and companies 
involved in corruption practices are nowadays facing an increased risk of 
prosecution, due to an increased awareness of corruption and the damage it is 
causing, increased pressure from NGOs, civil society, and the government, better 
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laws, and an increased risk of detection. For companies, the criminal penalty will 
normally be a substantial fine. But lately, governments, funders, project owners, 
competitors, and employers are less tolerant of corruption, and therefore the 
company is facing other long-term effects (GIACC/TI, 2008 and UNGC, 2011). 
Therefore, we use the home country level of corruption as an indication of home 
country norms regarding corruption, and as a measure of how severe the 
consequences would be in the home country. We believe that a company from a 
country low on corruption will face greater consequences if it gets involved in 
corrupt practices (either at home or abroad), than a company from a country with 
a high corruption level. Moreover, companies coming from countries with high 
corruption could be better accustomed to dealing with instability and bureaucracy, 
and therefore, might make a different choice than a company from a corruption 
free environment. Accordingly, this might have an influence on choice of entry 
mode, and therefore we choose to control for it.  
3.2.5. Firm Size 
 
Peter Drucker (1974) suggests that there is an association between firm size and 
public scrutiny. Therefore, according to him, increased exposure does not reflect a 
higher degree of hostility towards large scale organizations, but it is in many cases 
the price of success and the result of exaggerated expectations from various 
stakeholders, such as government, NGO’s, employees and the public. As such, all 
these stakeholders might be more likely to take (legal) action against big scale 
companies.  
Dalton and Cosier (1982) support the same idea, saying that “the larger the 
organization becomes, the more actual and potential influence it commands over 
society. Society, necessarily, takes a greater interest in the affairs of such 
organizations”.  
Rindova et al. (2006) also note that larger firms face greater scrutiny from the 
media, than smaller companies because of their higher profiles. Simply put, with 
each increase in the influence of the organization, comes a greater public scrutiny 
and greater expectations. 
 
Given all of the above, we theorize that size could play an important role when a 
company chooses to make an equity investment in a corrupt environment, and has 
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to choose between JV and WOS. We expect large firms to enter using a JV, 
because they could “delegate” the corrupt practices to their partner, at least 
partially. Doing so would help them avoid public scrutiny and condemnation.  
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4.    Methodology 
4.1. Research Methodology 
 
For the purpose of our study, specifically investigating and testing the relationship 
between corruption and entry modes in emerging markets, we have chosen to 
focus on a time span of 11 years, from 2000 to 2011.  Most of the previous 
mentioned research analyzed data gathered before the year 2000 (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002; Wei and Smarzynska, 2000; Uhlebnruck et al. 2006), and since 
we are considering more recent investments, we hope to be able to bring new 
insight. We also have to mention that for a few of variables we have gathered data 
from one year only, since no additional information was offered in the databases 
we have used, nor in the companies annual reports/websites. But further details 
about this will be presented later on, when we discuss the process of gathering 
data for each variable. 
A quantitative method is preferred to conduct the analysis and test the hypotheses, 
since we believe corruption is a comprehensive and sensitive subject to discuss. 
Therefore a method based on numbers and statistics seems more appropriate. 
Moreover, in the case of quantitative research, the findings can usually be 
generalized to a greater extent, than in the case of qualitative research (Easterby-
Smith et al. 2008). The total list of home and host countries is included in 
Appendix 1. 
4.2. Data collection 
In order to investigate the relationship between corruption and entry modes in 
emerging markets, and to test all our proposed hypotheses, we have gathered data 
for our variables from various international databases, which we will present 
further on. 
 
First, we have acquired a data set of 559 projects in 31 emerging markets, from 
the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (PPI). This was 
the database used by Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) in their study, where they 
investigated entry modes in corrupt environments in the telecommunication 
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industry. What differentiates our study from theirs are not only the years taken 
into account, and the fact that we focus on different and multiple industries, but 
also the countries investigated. We chose to include only countries listed in one or 
more of the following emerging countries lists: Next Eleven/BRIC, CIVETS, 
FTSE, MSCI, The Economist, S&P, Dow Jones, BBVA EAGLE List (O’Neill, 
2001; Economist, 2009; FTSE, 2010; S&P, 2010; Dow Jones Indexes, 2011; 
MSCI, 2011; BBVA, 2012).  
 
The PPI database has the purpose of identifying and disseminating information on 
private participation in infrastructure projects, in low and middle-income 
countries. The availability of efficient infrastructure services is an important 
determinant of the pace of market development and output growth in emerging 
markets (Kirkpatrick et al. 2006).  Thus, the demand for infrastructure in 
emerging markets gives us reason to expect a stable flow of equity investments in 
these sectors, which makes them suitable for our study. Another reason why 
infrastructure projects are appropriate for our research is due to the projects in the 
database, that do not have to be entirely privately owned, financed or operated; 
therefore, some have public participation as well. This means that they are 
characterized by high involvement of public officials, which can mean they are 
more prone to engage in corruption (Transparency International - Bribe Payers 
Index, 2011). The database focuses on sectors with some monopoly or oligopoly 
characteristics. More competitive sectors, such as airlines and gas production, are 
not included. The database classifies infrastructure projects into four sectors with 
under sectors: 
  
1. Energy - Electricity generation, transmission and distribution 
- Natural gas transmission and distribution 
2. Telecommunications - Fixed or mobile local telephony 
- Domestic long distance telephony 
- International long distance telephony 
3. Transport - Airport runways and terminals 
- Railways 
- Toll roads, bridges, highways and tunnels 
- Port infrastructure, superstructures, terminals and channels 
4. Water - Portable water generation and distribution 
- Sewerage collection and treatment 
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4.2.1. Variables  
 
In the following part, we will present all the variables included in the analysis, and 
the way we measure them. An overview of all variables can be seen in Table 4b.  
 
Dependent variable 
 
Throughout the study, our dependent variable, entry mode (known as 
EntryModeCode in our regression), which can take two values, JV (Joint Venture) 
and WOS (Wholly Owned Subsidiary), will be based on information gathered 
from the aforementioned dataset. Ownership in the project from 1 up to 99% is 
considered a JV, whereas in a WOS, the investing firm has a 100% ownership. 
We have chosen to use a dummy variable, and code JV to 1 and, WOS to 0.  
 
Independent variables 
Regarding host country corruption (known as HostCountryCorruption in our 
regression), we have used the Transparency International Global Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI), which is based on data collected from 17 data sources, 
from 13 institutions worldwide. The corruption indicator is divided on a scale 
from 1 to 10, 1 representing the most corrupt country, and 10 the least corrupt 
country. The countries are ranked annually by their perceived level of corruption, 
as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. The index is built upon 
the perception of corruption because the concept is to a great extent hidden and 
difficult to measure (Transparency International Web Site).  We are using data 
regarding corruption from only one year, specifically 2011, since we have 
checked the variation of corruption over the years, and the values are very much 
alike (Transparency International, 2011). Therefore, we believe this will not bias 
our results.  
 
Another independent variable is the level of technological sophistication of the 
company (known as RDSalesPercentage in our regression), which as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, can have an impact upon the choice of entry mode. 
To properly assess the level of technological sophistication of a firm, we use the 
ratio of a firm’s R&D expenditure to the value of sales (Javorcik and Wei, 2009). 
To gather the numbers, we accessed the annual reports of the firms, on the online 
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version of Bloomberg Businessweek, and the “2011 EU Industrial R&D 
Investment Scoreboard”. Just as for the corruption variable, we have gathered data 
only from 2011, since we were not able to fin older values on online databases, or 
company annual reports/websites.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, we have seen from the Bribe Payers Survey 2011, that 
there are differences regarding the likelihood of bribes being paid by companies in 
19 different business sectors. Therefore, we consider our next independent 
variable to be industry’s likelihood of bribery (known as IndustryRate in our 
regression), which can take values between 0 and 10, where a maximum score of 
10 corresponds with a view that companies from that industry never engage in 
bribery when doing business abroad, and the minimum score of 0 indicates they 
always do. The sectors we used in our paper are transportation and storage, 
telecommunications, power generation and transmission, mining, oil and gas, and 
mining with the corresponding values of 6.7, 6.7, 6.4, 6.3, 6.2, and 6.1 (Bribe 
Payers Survey, 2011). Moreover, all these sectors are usually characterized by 
high government involvement. The cleanest sectors, in terms of bribery of public 
officials, were identified as information technology, fisheries, and banking and 
finance (Bribe Payers Survey, 2011). As such, the sectors we are investigating are 
more likely to engage in corruption, which in turn is more prone to affect the entry 
mode. At the same time, there is still a difference between the sectors we are 
including, which will give us an indication if there are any discrepancies between 
the industries likelihood of bribing and entry mode.    
 
We placed the projects we have gathered data for in different sectors, as shown in 
the following table (Table 4a): 
 
Project Type Sector Type (Bribe Payers Index) 
- Electricity generation, transmission and distribution 
- Wind energy 
- Hydro energy 
- Solar energy 
Power generation and transmission 
- Sewerage collection and treatment 
- Portable water generation and distribution 
- Waste management 
Utilities 
- Airport runways and terminals Transportation and storage 
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- Railways 
- Toll roads, bridges, highways and tunnels 
- Port infrastructure, superstructures, terminals and channels 
- Fixed or mobile local telephony 
- Domestic and international long distance telephony 
- Cable 
Telecommunications 
- Natural gas transmission and distribution 
- Diesel 
Oil and gas 
- Coal Mining 
Table 4a 
 
Control Variables 
We also included a few additional variables, which we believe can influence the 
relationship between corruption and entry mode, and therefore need to be 
controlled for. They have been explained in detail in Chapter 3, therefore we will 
now only mention how we measured them.  
 
Cultural distance (known as CulturalDistanceCode in our regression) we will 
base on Hofstede’s research. In line with many previous statistical studies 
investigating entry modes, considering also cultural distance, we believe it is 
appropriate to measure the cultural distance through Kogut and Singh (1988) 
index. The index is based on Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions of uncertainty 
avoidance, power distance, individualism and masculinity.  
 
The proposed mathematical equation by Kogut and Singh's is the following: CDj = 
∑ {(Iij- Iih)
2 /Vi}/4, where Iij is the index for the ith cultural dimension (for 
instance Power Distance) and jth country (for instance Poland), h is the 
comparison country (for instance US), Vi is the variance of the index of the ith 
dimension, and CDj stands for the cultural distance of the jth country from h 
country (Kogut and Sing, 1988). Further on, in our analysis we have recoded the 
values obtained by applying Kogut and Singh’s Index in the following way: 
values under 1 were coded as 1, values between 1 and 2 were coded as 2, values 
between 2 and 3 were coded as 3, values between 3 and 4 were coded as 4, values 
between 4 and 5 were coded as 5, and values between 5 and 7 were coded as 6.  
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Although we acknowledge the limitations of the index (such as being based on 
Hofstede’s dimensions which have not been updated for over 20 years), we 
believe it is one of the best measures for cultural distance, since Hofstede’s 
dimensions can be found for many countries and they have been widely accepted 
inside the research community.  
 
Openness to trade is another important aspect to take into account, and it is 
represented by the restrictions on foreign investments, which can certainly affect 
the entry modes of companies. Our measure of the formal restrictions is taken 
from the Heritage Foundation’s annual Index of Economic Freedom (2011), and 
we labeled it openness to trade (known as OpenesstotradeCode in the regression). 
The index is graded on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents no openness, and 
100 complete openness to trade. For our regression we have further recoded the 
values from 1 to 5, in the following way: values from Heritage Foundation’s 
website under 50 were coded with 1, values between 50 and 60 were coded with 
2, values between 60 and 70 were coded with 3, values between 70 and 80 were 
coded with 4, and finally, values between 80 and 100 were coded with 5. 
 
Regarding home country legislation (known as Legislation in the regression), we 
will look at investments from the United States in particular, and investments 
from the United Kingdom after 2010, to see if there have been any changes after 
the strict legislation was implemented. We used a dummy variable where we 
coded firms from the United States and United Kingdom (only investments after 
2010) 1, and the other firms 0.  
 
For home country corruption (known as HomeCountryCorruption in the 
regression) we used the Transparency International Index and inserted the level of 
corruption for the host country according to the scale, where 1 represents the most 
corrupt country and 10 the least corrupt one. 
 
Our last control variable is size of firm (known as FirmSize in the regression), 
which can be measured in various ways. According to Drucker (1974), perhaps 
the best measurement for the size of the company is employment, considering 
other measurements of the size such as sales and value added to be quite 
misleading in many cases. He argues that a chemical company with $30 million of 
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sales may be fairly big, but on the other hand, a metalworking company with the 
same volume of sales is barely viable. Additionally, value added can prove to be 
improper as well, since it is meaningless for retail firms, as well as for the banking 
and life insurance sectors.  
 
Furthermore, we believe employment is an appropriate measure since in the case 
of a corruption scandal, the company is going to be affected, and implicitly 
employees as well, being one of the most vulnerable categories of stakeholders.  
For our study we have decided to use the natural logarithm of the number of the 
employees in order to account for the fact that the median number of employees 
for firms in a certain industry, is less than the mean. This is due to the fact that the 
distribution of employees is skewed and not normal (Becker-Blease et al. 2010).  
 
All the variables included in our study are summarized in the following table 
(Table 4b): 
 
Type Variable Measure Value Source 
Dependent EntryModeCode Type of entry mode 
of a company in host 
country 
JV (1) or 
WOS (0) 
PPI Database 
Independent HostCountryCorruption Host Country 
Corruption by CPI 
Index  
0-10 Transparency 
International (2011) 
Independent RDSalesPercentage Firm’s R&D 
Expenditure divided 
to Value of Sales 
Percentage Company websites, 
The 2011 EU 
Industrial R&D 
Investment 
Scoreboard, 
Bloomberg 
Independent IndustryRate Likelihood of bribes 
being paid by 
companies in 
different sectors 
0-10 Transparency 
International (2011) 
Control CulturalDistanceCode The degree of 
cultural distance 
between home and 
host countries. Ratio 
between the cultural 
dimensions 
Number 
 
 
Based on Hofstede’s 
Cultural Distance 
Research 
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Control OpennesstotradeCode Any restrictions 
regarding FDI in 
host country 
0-100 Heritage 
Foundation’s annual 
Index of Economic 
Freedom (2011) 
Control Legislation UK firms after 2010, 
American firms 
American and 
UK firms (1), 
other firms 
(0) 
UK Bribery Act 
(2010), Foreign 
Corrupt Practices 
Act (1977) 
Control HomeCountryCorruption Home Country 
Corruption by CPI 
Index  
0 - 10 Transparency 
International (2011) 
Control FirmSize Ln (Number of 
Employees) 
 Company’s Annual 
Report (2011) 
Table 4b 
4.3. Analysis of data 
Due to our dependent variable, Entry Mode, which is dichotomous and 
categorical, being able to take the values of JV coded as “1”, and WOS coded as 
“0”, we consider logistic regression to be appropriate for analyzing our data. 
Additionally, according to Burns and Burns (2008) in situations where the 
independent variables are categorical, or a mix of continuous and categorical, and 
the dependent variable is categorical, logistic regression is necessary.  
 
Additionally, we prefer the logistic regression because of its similarity to multiple 
regression, having a set of straightforward statistical tests and a wide range of 
diagnostics (Hair et al. 2010; Field, 2009). Moreover, our sample size is 
appropriate, since sample sizes greater than 400 are ideal for logistic regression 
(Hair et al. 2010).  
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Correlation Test 
However, before going any further we analyzed the correlation matrix for all our 
independent variables, which reports the correlation between the included 
variables. 
 
Table 4c 
From our correlation matrix we can see that there is a certain amount of 
correlation between some variables, especially between Cultural Distance 
(CulturalDistanceCode) and Legislation (Legislation(1)). To better assess the 
multicollinearity between our predictors, we checked the Tolerance and VIF 
values since they are the two most common measures for assessing variables 
collinearity. Tolerance is defined as the amount of variability of the selected 
independent variable not explained by the other independent variables, and the 
variance inflation factor (VIF), is calculated simply as the inverse of the tolerance 
value (Myers, 1990; Menard, 1995). In order to obtain these values, we conducted 
a linear regression analysis with all our variables. 
 
The results can be seen in table 4d in Appendix 2. The tolerance value should be 
high, which means a small degree of multicollinearity. As Menard (1995) 
suggests, a tolerance value less than 0.1 almost certainly indicates a serious 
collinearity problem. While for the VIF, Myers (1990) states that a VIF value 
greater than 10 is a real cause for concern, but even values between 3 and 5 can be 
a problem for the researcher. Thus, instances of high degrees of multicollinearity 
are reflected in lower tolerance values and higher VIF values. Since our VIF 
values are under 3, and tolerance values are higher than 0.1, we concluded that we 
do not have a problem with multicollinearity. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
 
Our analysis includes in total 559 cases (infrastructure projects). From Table 5a 
we can see detailed descriptive statistics of our dependent variable, together with 
our independent variables. As can be seen from the table, the mean for our 
dependent variable named here EntryModeCode is 0.70. As mentioned before, we 
have coded the entry mode with 1 in the case of JV, and 0 in the case of WOS. 
Therefore, given the mean value, we can see that on average, 70 % of the entries 
are implemented as JVs, this representing the majority.  
 
Regarding the level of corruption in the country where the investment is taking 
place, named here HostCountryCorruption, we can see that the variable takes 
values from 1.5 to 7.2, meaning that the observations have a wide range, 
encompassing emerging countries with high, and quite low levels of corruption.  
Further on, a similar situation can be seen for the corruption level in the investing 
country, named HomeCountryCorruption. The variable ranges from a minimum 
of 2.4, up to a maximum of 9.4, which means that investing countries are 
characterized by high, respectively low levels of corruption.  
 
Moreover, for hypothesis 2 we include one additional variable, specifically 
RDSalesPercentage, which shows the level of investments in R&D, the 
companies made. Here we have information for 242 cases, but since the 
hypothesis will be tested separately, it will not influence the other regression 
analysis. From the Table 5a we can see that R&D investments represent between 
0% and 7.5% of the company’s sales, while the mean is very low, reaching 
0.81%. Additionally, it is important to mention that for HomeCountryCorruption 
there are 8 missing cases (1.4%), for Openness to trade Code 10 (1.8%), for 
Cultural Distance Code 34 (6.1%) and for lnFirmSize 107 (19.1%). According to 
IBM SPSS Missing Values 20 (2011) when there are few missing cases (around 
5%), simply excluding those cases from the analysis is considered safe. Therefore, 
since we are missing a considerable number of cases for the Firm Size, we will 
run two regressions, one without the variable, and one with it. 
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Table 5a 
 
5.1. Regression Results 
 
In this part of the paper we are going to present the results of the conducted 
regressions for each hypothesis individually. But first, we want to test for any 
possible direct relationship between host country corruption and entry modes, as 
suggested in previous literature. Therefore, our first regression will be a general 
one, which will include only the two aforementioned variables.  
 
After running the logistic regression in SPSS, we can see from Table 5b that host 
country corruption is insignificant at 5% significance level (the significance level 
is much larger than 0.05). Before drawing any conclusions we want to test out two 
hypotheses as well, and see if anything changes after adding our independent 
variables.  
 
 
Table 5b 
 
For testing hypothesis 1 we decided to run three separate logistic regressions: for 
the first one, we took into account only our two main independent variables (host 
country corruption and the industry likelihood of bribing), while for the second 
one we include some additional variables, which we believe we have to control 
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for, and for the third one we control for Firm Size as well. An overview can be 
seen in the table below (Table 5c):  
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Dependent 
variable 
Entry Mode Entry Mode Entry Mode 
Independent 
variables 
HostCountryCorruption 
Industry Rate 
HostCountryCorruption 
Industry Rate 
HostCountryCorruption 
Industry Rate 
Additional 
independent 
variables that 
we control for 
 HomeCountryCorruption 
Openness to trade 
Cultural Distance 
Legislation 
 
HomeCountryCorruption 
Openness to trade 
Cultural Distance 
Legislation 
lnFirmSize 
Table 5c 
 
Regression 1: 
The regression showed the impact host country corruption and the likelihood of 
bribery in each sector have on the entry mode choice of the investing companies. 
After running the logistic regression, we obtained the following results:  
 
 
 
Table 5d 
 
As we can see from the results, contrary to our expectations based on previous 
research, host country corruption was insignificant at a 5% significance level. On 
the other hand, our variable IndustryRate was highly significant, which means that 
the industry’s likelihood of bribery influences the entry mode choice, as we have 
hypothesized. More specifically, companies will be more likely to rely on JVs 
when investing in industries where bribes are common.  
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Regressions 2 and 3: 
In order to see any potential differences, and to avoid any potential bias of our 
results, we included control variables in our analysis as well. Therefore, we ran 
regressions 2 and 3. The results for regression 2 can be seen in the table 5e in 
Appendix 2. At first glance, after including the control variables, we could easily 
observe that the log-likelihood value of our model improved. As such, the initial 
value was 634.302 and reached 614.585, which means that the additional 
predictors contribute positively to the model.  
Additionally, we observed that Industry (the industry’s likelihood of bribery) and 
Openness to Trade were all significant at a 5% significance level, which means 
that they have an impact on the entry mode decision a company makes when 
investing in a corrupt environment. The other independent variables (Host 
Country Corruption, Home Country Corruption, Legislation and Cultural 
Distance) were, however, not significant, which means that they do not have a 
significant contribution on a company’s entry mode decision in an emerging 
country. 
 
Before properly analyzing the results, we included Firm Size as a control variable 
as well, to see if any modifications occur. As a short reminder, we considered it 
necessary to conduct a separate analysis when including Firm Size variable 
because we were missing around 19% of the cases for this factor. As such, in 
order to avoid a wrong generalization of our results, we considered it necessary to 
separate the analyses. The results when we also included Firm Size, measured as 
natural logarithm of the number of employees in each company, can be seen in 
table 5f. After adding our last control variable, the log likelihood of the model 
further improves from 497.595 to 477.816, which means that the additional 
predictor positively contributes to the model.  
Table 5f 
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Moreover, we can observe that in this case, Industry Rate (the industry’s 
likelihood of bribery), Openness to Trade Code and lnFirmSize were all 
significant at a 5% significance level, which means that they do have an impact on 
the entry mode decision a company makes when investing in a corrupt 
environment. The other independent variables (Host Country Corruption, Home 
Country Corruption, Legislation and Cultural Distance) were still not significant, 
which means that they do not have a significant contribution on a company’s 
entry mode decision in an emerging country.   
 
For hypothesis 2 we included the technological sophistication of the firm, 
measured as the ratio of a firm’s R&D expenditure to the value of sales (Javorcik 
and Wei, 2009). We conducted this analysis separately due to the fact that we do 
not have data for all cases (226 cases are included for hypothesis 2).  
For testing the hypothesis we ran two regressions, one without the Firm Size 
variable, since we have some missing cases there as well. As such, an overview 
can be seen in the table 5g: 
 Regression 4 Regression 5 
Dependent Variable Entry Mode Entry Mode 
Independent Variables HostCountryCorruption 
RDSalesPercentage 
HostCountryCorruption 
RDSalesPercentage 
Additional Independent Variables that we 
control for 
HomeCountryCorruption 
Openness to trade 
Cultural Distance 
Legislation 
 
HomeCountryCorruption 
Openness to trade 
Cultural Distance 
Legislation 
lnFirmSize 
Table 5g 
 
Regressions 4 and 5: 
Regression 4 shows the impact corruption in a host country and the technological 
sophistication of the firm have on the entry mode choice of the investing 
companies. The results can be viewed in table 5h in Appendix 2. Cultural 
Distance was significant at a 5% significance level, which means that they have 
an impact on the entry mode decision a company makes when investing in a 
corrupt environment. The other independent variables (Host Country Corruption, 
RDSalesPercentage, Home Country Corruption, Legislation, Openness to trade, 
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and Cultural Distance) are not significant, which means that they do not have a 
significant contribution on a company’s entry mode decision in an emerging 
country.  
 
In the final regression (regression 5) we included Firm Size as a control variable 
as well, to see if any modifications occurred, like we did in regression 3. The 
results can be seen in the following table (Table 5i):  
 
 
Table 5i 
After adding this additional control variable we can see that the log-likelihood of 
the model improves, which means that Firm Size positively contributes to the 
model (log-likelihood reaches a minimum value of 256.154). In this case we can 
see that Firm Size is significant, while all the other variables were not.  
5.1.1. Interpretation of the Results 
 
We are going to interpret the coefficients of all our logistic regressions together, 
since the sign of them and most of the significance is the same.  
 
Industry Rate is significant in regressions 1 – 3, and shows a significant and 
positive relationship, which means that the higher the likelihood of bribery in a 
given sector, the more likely the investing companies will rely on JVs, which is 
just as we hypothesized in hypotheses 1.  
 
Host Country Corruption although it is insignificant at 5% significance level, 
has a positive coefficient in the results for Hypothesis 1, which is in accordance 
with most of the previous literature regarding corruption and entry modes. Thus, it 
can be said that firms will be more prone to choose a JV when investing in a 
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corrupt environment (Wei and Smarzynska, 2000; Javorcik and Wei, 2009; 
Demirbag et al. 2009; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). On the contrary, the results for 
Hypothesis 2 bring a negative coefficient, and so, it can be said that firms will 
favor a WOS when investing in a corrupt environment.  
Home Country Corruption proves also to be insignificant, and it has a negative 
coefficient for regression one, two, three and four, which suggests that the higher 
the home country corruption, the more likely the investing firms will choose a 
WOS as an entry mode. On the contrary, the sign for the variable for regression 
number five is positive, which suggests that the higher the home country 
corruption, the more likely firms will choose a JV as an entry mode.  
 
Openness to trade is significant, and its coefficient has a negative sign, which 
tells us that the variable does influence the choice of entry mode, in the following 
way: when restrictions to equity investments are low, companies will favor WOS, 
while in the opposite case they will be prone towards a JV with a partner (Re-
interpretation: When openness to trade is high, companies will favor WOS).  
 
Legislation as well proves to be insignificant, and its positive coefficient 
(Hypothesis 1) suggests that the odds of a company from a country with 
legislation against corruption, to choose JV as an operating mode, are higher.  
Which to a certain degree supports the assumption made by Wei and Smarzynska 
(2000) regarding US firms. On the other hand, in Hypothesis 2, Legislation has a 
negative coefficient, which suggests the contrary. The odds of a company from a 
country with legislation against corruption, to choose WOS as an operating mode, 
are higher.  
 
Cultural distance seems to be insignificant in regression 3 (hypotheses 1), but is 
has a positive coefficient. At regression 4 (hypotheses 2) cultural distance is 
significant, and has a positive coefficient, which means that the higher the cultural 
distance between the home and the host country, the higher the odds for a 
company to enter the market using a JV. Accordingly, we find support for some of 
the previous research regarding this matter (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001; 
Hennart and Larimo, 1998: Kogut and Singh, 1988; Erramilli and Rao, 1993), and 
we contradict the studies arguing that the higher the cultural distance, the more 
 40 
WOS we will see due to the risk and uncertainty of cooperating with local 
partners (Sim and Pandian, 2003; Mulok, 2010; Chang et al. 2012).  
 
Our last variable, firm size, added in regression 3 and 5, and measured as the 
number of employees proves to be highly significant and it has a positive 
coefficient. Therefore, it can be concluded that the number of employees of a 
firm, clearly influences its entry mode choice. More specifically, in our case, the 
larger the firm (in terms of employment), the more likely it will enter an emerging 
and corrupted market using a joint venture, instead of a wholly owned subsidiary, 
because in this case they can delegate the responsibility for eventual corrupt 
practices to their partners. As such, we are finding support for previous research 
(Drucker, 1974; Dalton and Cosier, 1982; Rindova et al. 2006).  
 
5.1.2. Discussion of the Results 
After seeing the results, we can say that hypothesis 1 is only partly supported, 
since we find the industry’s likelihood of bribery to be significant and have an 
influence on the entry mode choice, but on the other hand, host country corruption 
is proven to be insignificant. Hypothesis 2 is not supported, since both host 
country corruption and R&D ratio are insignificant. Our results regarding 
corruption contradict previous studies, which argue that corruption has an 
influence on the entry mode choice and concludes with a preference for either 
joint ventures (Wei and Smarzynska, 2000; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006; Javorcik and 
Wei, 2009; Demirbag et al. 2009), or for wholly owned subsidiaries (Tekin-Koru, 
2006).  
 
In order to understand why we get different results from previous studies, and 
why our hypotheses are not supported, we will look at different possible 
explanations:  
  
First of all, we will quickly summarize the methodologies and main focus of the 
studies conducted in the area of corruption and entry mode strategy. The earlier 
studies generally focus on one industry, in multiple countries (Wei and 
Smarzynska, 2000; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006; Javorcik and Wei, 2009). Uhlenbruck 
et al. (2006) focus on 64 emerging countries, while Javorcik and Wei (2000) and 
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Wei and Smarzynska (2009) both include 22 emerging countries from Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. The industries investigated are telecommunications 
(Uhlenbruck et al. 2006), and manufacturing (Wei and Smarzynska, 2000; 
Javorcik and Wei, 2009). Moreover, the studies that are investigating multiple 
industries are only focusing on one country, namely inward FDI to Turkey 
(Tekin-Koru, 2006), or outward FDI from Turkey (Demirbag et al. 2009). Thus, 
what differentiates this study from existing studies are that we are looking at 
investments from both emerging and developed countries, we include multiple 
industries, look at multiple countries in one study, and we are using the 
Transparency International’s Corruption Index (CPI).  
 
As mentioned, for measuring the corruption level in different countries we used 
the Transparency International’s Corruption Index, which has been used in 
previous research as well (Cuervo-Cazzura, 2008; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002, 
Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). But unlike other researchers, our approach was a general 
one, and we have not divided the concept of corruption in arbitrary and pervasive 
corruption (Cuervo-Cazzura, 2008; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006) We considered the 
general index measuring corruption, offered by Transparency International, to be 
the most appropriate because we adopted a very general definition for corruption 
(“Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” - Transparency 
International, 2011); we wanted to see how all forms of corruption affect the entry 
mode decision, and as such, we did not want to split the concept, or to narrow it 
down.  
For home country corruption, we believe the insignificance could be explained 
in a similar way, since we used the same index for it, as for host country 
corruption. Furthermore, perhaps it would have been useful to split the home 
countries in two subsamples, one for developed countries and one for the 
emerging ones.  
 
Furthermore, we consider that another reason for the insignificance of corruption 
is related to the possible global concentration of the industries where the firms are 
investing, as explained by Hill et al.’s framework (1990). For instance, the authors 
of the framework argue that in cases of global oligopolies when “MNEs enter a 
foreign market, especially the home markets of their global rivals, they may have 
strategic objectives that go beyond the narrow calculus of choosing the most 
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efficient entry mode for that particular market” (Hill et al. 1990). From their 
statement we can see that in some situations, the MNEs could ignore country 
related risks such as corruption, and invest based on their own 
“criteria”/objectives. This could have been one of the causes for the insignificance 
of corruption.  
 
It seems that the likelihood of bribery in each industry, which is a form of 
corruption, is way more important to firms investing in those specific sectors, than 
is the general corruption level of the host country. Perhaps in our case, since we 
have included many sectors with high government involvement, which are usually 
characterized by frequent bribes, seeing corruption as a “process of bribing” 
would have been more appropriate. Apparently, questions such as “How often do 
firms in each sector: a) engage in bribery of low-level public officials, for 
example to speed up administrative processes and/or facilitate the granting of 
licenses?; b) use improper contributions to high-ranking politicians or political 
parties to achieve influence?; and c) pay or receive bribes from other private 
firms?”(Bribe Payers Index, 2011) seem to be more influential for the firm’s entry 
modes than the country level of corruption. 
 
Moreover, for hypothesis 2, as Hill et al. (1990) suggest in their framework, 
environmental variables such as ownership/control risks (e.g. expropriation, 
intervention) is important to consider. As discussed before, it is important to have 
a local partner in a turbulent environment, but since emerging markets are usually 
characterized by instability and a lack of a clear and comprehensive legislation, 
keeping safe the know-how prevails. Especially in our case, since we have 
discussed about investments in research and development, which bring along the 
notion of firm specific and tacit know-how. Perhaps by controlling for these 
additional factors (ownership/control risks), and by including a greater number of 
companies (including firms with high R&D levels), the results would have been 
different.   
 
 
 
 
 43 
In the following we will briefly discuss the other variable’s implication to the 
study:  
 
Openness to trade: In this case the variable is significant, and we believe the 
results are clear. As long as we do not take into account other factors that 
influence operating modes, firms prefer to use high commitment entry modes in 
an economically free country, where there are no restrictions to equity 
investments. In the opposite case, if there are restrictions, then collaborating with 
a local partner will be the only solution for equity investments.  
 
Cultural distance between states can bring along higher or lower commitments 
from investing companies (Kirkman et al. 2006), which could translate in either 
more WOSs or JVs. In our case, the cultural distance is insignificant in 
regressions 1, 2, 3 and 5, obtaining the same result as some previous studies 
(Tihanyi et al. 2005). On the other hand it is significant in regression 4 
(Hypothesis 2), which means that the higher the cultural distance between the 
home and the host country, the higher the odds for a company to enter the market 
using a JV. As mentioned before, this brings support for some of the previous 
research (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Kogut and 
Singh, 1988; Erramilli and Rao, 1993), and at the same time contradicts the 
studies arguing that the higher the cultural distance, the more WOS we will see 
due to the risk and uncertainty of cooperating with local partners (Sim and 
Pandian, 2003; Mulok, 2010; Chang et al. 2012).  
 
The insignificance of the variable for the other regression could be related to the 
fact that the companies from our sample come from both developed and emerging 
countries, and are investing in the emerging ones. Perhaps we should have 
developed two subsamples, one with developed home countries, and one with 
emerging home countries. Moreover, according to Tihanyi et al. (2005), culture is 
a concept difficult to define precisely, and it is perhaps unrealistic to expect to 
encompass all the discrepancies between nations by using one single measure. 
Following the same line of reasoning, some researchers have proposed different 
additions to already developed indexes for cultural distance. For example, 
Shenkar (2001) recommended the supplementation of Kogut and Singh (1988) 
index by considering the Long Term Orientation (Confucian Dynamism) part as 
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well, especially in the case of East-Asian countries. As such, all these elements 
could have biased in one way or another our results. 
 
Home country legislation is not significant, so it means that firms do not really 
take it into account when entering a foreign emerging and corrupt market. We 
believe that the variable should be discussed mainly for the second hypothesis, 
where the technological sophistication level of the companies’ variable is added. 
We argue so because US investors in companies high on technological 
sophistication were found to be more prone to choose joint ventures in corrupt 
countries, than investors of other nationalities, which contradicts the results Wei 
and Smarzynska found in 2000, where firms high on technological sophistication 
normally would choose WOS. We can see that Legislation has a negative 
coefficient in the results for hypothesis 2, but it is still insignificant. Apparently, 
the companies included in our study do not consider the possible punishments 
they could suffer in their home countries (US and UK only), when investing 
abroad, in corrupted and emerging economies. As such, perhaps one could argue 
that when a firm opts for an equity investment in a corrupted country, it bases its 
entry mode decision on other criteria, such as the other variables included in our 
analysis.  
 
Firm size, as we measured it as the number of employees is highly significant in 
our study. This means that large firms are more likely to enter emerging markets 
using a joint venture, instead of a wholly owned subsidiary, because in this case 
they can delegate the responsibility for eventual corrupt practices to their partners. 
As previous authors have suggested (Drucker, 1974; Dalton and Cosier, 1982; 
Rindova, Pollock and Hayward, 2006), large companies are more exposed to 
public scrutiny, and so the risk of being sued for corrupt practices (in our case) is 
higher. As such, it seems natural that they prefer a low commitment equity 
investment, such as the JV, where they can exit the market more easily, and they 
have a local partner that can handle the bureaucratic aspects of the business. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
According to our data, the general perception of corruption as a whole does not 
have an influence on the entry mode. This means that when researching the 
influence on corruption on entry modes, a more thorough measure of corruption, 
which categorizes corruption more precisely, should be used.      
 
Neither of our hypotheses was fully supported. However, we found that the 
industry’s likelihood of paying bribes had an influence on the entry mode, which 
gave us partial support for hypothesis 1. We found that the higher the likelihood 
of bribery in a given sector, the more likely the investing companies would rely 
on JVs. This is interesting because, this specific topic has not been investigated 
before, and since corruption in the host country was not significant, it can mean 
that the influence of corruption depends more on the specific industry where the 
investment is taking place. It seems that the likelihood of bribery in each industry, 
which is a form of corruption, is way more important to firms investing in those 
specific sectors, than is the general corruption level of the host country.     
Additionally, we found that the factors that did influence the entry mode were the 
size of the firms, and the openness to trade in the host country. Thus, we consider 
that managers should be aware of the size of the firm, measured as the number of 
employees, when opting for an equity entry mode in an emerging and corrupted 
environment. Perhaps the key point here is that the more employees are in a firm, 
the more socially responsible the company is/should be. Therefore, when 
investing in a turbulent environment (such as a corrupt economy), bigger 
companies should choose a JV, because having a local partner means in a way 
less responsibility, and in the end less risk (in the case of corrupt practices, they 
could be delegated to the JV partner). 
6.1. Limitations and Future Research Topics 
 
Our study together with previous studies, have mostly used quantitative, 
secondary data, with a big sample size.  Thus, the results might be too general, 
and in our case they do not turn out to be significant. As corruption and entry 
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modes are complex and sensitive topics to investigate, we believe more qualitative 
studies should be done in the area, in addition to the quantitative ones. Doing so, 
new perspectives on the relationship between corruption and entry modes could 
be discovered. 
Moreover, some of the data used in our research is taken from one year only, 
which could have an influence on the results, since there could have been major 
changes from one year to another. We tried to avoid this limitation, but in some 
cases we found it impossible to gather data from various years, since it was 
unavailable in the companies annual reports/websites, or in the online databases 
we had access to. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that we found industries’ likelihood to bribe to be highly 
significant, tells us that the type of corruption, in addition to where the corruption 
(or bribing) takes place, matters more to firms than the general corruption, as we 
have also seen in previous studies investigating arbitrary and pervasive corruption 
(Cuervo-Cazzura, 2008; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). As mentioned before, our goal 
was to have a general perspective on corruption and its effects on the entry mode 
choice. But perhaps a more narrow definition for corruption would have offered 
better insight. As such, we believe that future research should dig more into what 
type of corruption affects the entry mode choice, and in what circumstances. 
Additionally, this analysis should be done in various industries, to see if there are 
any notable differences.  
We also acknowledge that our study has focus on a limited number of industries. 
Therefore, we think it is important that future papers will take into account 
various other industries, both the high-tech, and the less technology focused ones. 
 
Last but not least, we hope that Hill et al.’s framework (1990) will be investigated 
further. The environmental and the transaction variables have been researched 
already, but the strategic variables have not been paid much attention in relation to 
corruption. As such, we are confident that by continuing the analysis and 
development of the model, valuable new insight regarding the influence 
corruption has on entry modes, could be gained.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 – Home and Host Countries 
Nr. Home Contries Host Contries 
1. Argentina Afghanistan 
2. Australia Argentina 
3. Austria Bangladesh 
4. Bermuda Brazil 
5. Brazil Bulgaria 
6. Canada Chile 
7. Chile China 
8. China Colombia 
9. Colombia Egypt 
10. Cyprus India 
11. Czech Republic Indonesia 
12. Denmark Iran 
13. Egypt South Korea 
14. Finland Malaysia 
15. France Mexico 
16. Germany Morocco 
17. Greece Nigeria 
18. India Pakistan 
19. Israel Peru 
20. Italy Philippines 
21. Japan Romania 
22. Kazakhstan Russian Federation 
23. South Korea South Africa 
24. Kuwait Sri Lanka 
25. Luxemburg Sudan 
26. Malaysia Thailand 
27. Mauritius Tunisia 
28. Mexico Turkey 
29. Monaco Ukraine 
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30. Netherlands Venezuela 
31. Norway Vietnam 
32. Oman  
33. Philippines  
34. Portugal  
35. Qatar  
36. Russian Federation  
37. Saudi Arabia  
38. Singapore  
39. Slovakia  
40. South Africa  
41. Spain  
42. Sweden  
43. Switzerland  
44. Thailand  
45. Turkey  
46. UAE  
47. UK  
48. US  
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Appendix 2 - Tables  
 
Table 4d 
 
Table 5e 
Table 5i 
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1.     Introduction 
  
International capital flows have reshaped the whole international economic 
landscape in the last two decades. One of the main components of these flows is 
foreign direct investment (FDI), which has grown at a faster rate than most other 
international transactions (Bloningen, 2005), and which has led to the economic 
development of many nations (Doh et al. 2003). 
Previous research has found that corruption has a negative impact on foreign 
direct investment (FDI), influencing also the choice of companies’ entry modes.  
Still, emerging markets, that rank high on the corruption index, attract large 
amounts of FDI. Since MNE’s still choose to enter foreign markets high on 
corruption, this gives us a reason to believe that those companies will choose an 
alternative way to handle the corruption.  
 
Therefore, throughout the paper, we will investigate if corruption has an impact 
on the companies’ choice of entry mode. Earlier research shows that firms from 
industrialized countries have a tendency to choose Joint Ventures (JV) over 
Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) when they enter emerging markets ranking 
high on corruption. However, the research conducted in the area has mainly 
focused on American MNE’s and is restricted to emerging countries in Asia or 
former Soviet Union, and those who are comparing countries being restricted to 
one industry. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to analyse the relationship 
between the choice of MNE entry modes, and corruption, in several sectors from 
Brazil, Russia and Mexico to enrich the literature and see if this theory also counts 
in multiple industries and countries.  
 
We have chosen to discuss several sectors, in order to be able to better assess the 
differences that might exist between the various industries of the economy, since 
it is plausible to find notable discrepancies. Additionally, we believe previously 
enumerated countries, are appropriate for our research question since they have 
attracted a large amount of FDI the last decade(s) (Ranjan 2011; World Bank 
2012), are expected to grow further, and in addition score high on corruption 
(Transparency International).  Moreover, they all have open economies in which a 
100% foreign ownership is possible, this being also the reason for why we have 
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excluded China and India, where the government imposes several restrictions 
towards foreign FDI (World Bank Group, 2010). 
 
It is also essential to note that in the last two decades, the world has changed a lot 
in terms of geopolitics and economics, emerging countries such as Brazil and 
Russia acquiring an important role in the world economy (Ranjan 2011). 
Likewise, Mexico has a significant importance, being Latin America’s second 
largest recipient of FDI, and reporting inflows in 2010, up with 22 per cent over 
their 2009 level (the World Bank 2012). Thus, we consider that the paper will 
positively contribute to the limited number of studies that examine the 
relationship between MNE’s entry modes and host country corruption, since our 
research will focus on dynamic countries that present real opportunities for 
investors and companies. Additionally, we will contribute to the literature of FDI 
and entry modes by strengthening the theory further, or proving it wrong. 
Regarding the methodology part, we will choose a quantitative approach, where 
we will gather data regarding corruption indices and entry modes from various 
databases, which we will later employ in our regression analysis. 
  
The thesis will be structured in the following way. In the next section, a short 
theoretical description of the foreign direct investment, companies entry modes 
and corruption concepts will be provided, together with the connection between 
the three, and afterwards a comprehensive literature review concerning the 
relationship between corruption and the choice of entry modes will be presented. 
In the methodology section we will shortly present how the research is going to be 
conducted, mentioning also the main variables that we will include in the analysis. 
In conclusion, limitations, potential implications of the study, and further research 
topics will be suggested.  
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2.     Background Information 
2.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
  
FDI has been highly discussed in both academic and policy-making environments 
during the last decades, and therefore a vast amount of studies and published 
articles regarding both the determinants and effects of the phenomena exist. One 
of the reasons is perhaps the fact that vast amounts of capital are involved, and 
FDI is very important for the recipient countries, having in some cases positive 
spill over effects (Meyer and Sinani 2009). Developing as well as developed 
countries seek to attract FDI due to its many advantages for economic 
development, FDI inflows bringing in some cases not only capital to an economy, 
but also transferring knowledge, technology and skills, as well as generating 
employment (UNCTAD 2009; Zhang et al. 2010). 
  
According to Dunning (2000), FDI is an activity that is designed to satisfy a 
particular foreign market (market seeking or demand oriented FDI), to gain access 
to natural resources (resource seeking or supply oriented FDI), to promote a more 
efficient division of labour (rationalized or efficiency seeking FDI), to protect or 
augment the existing of specific advantages of the investing firm (strategic asset 
seeking FDI). While OECD came with a definition for the multinational activities 
that fall under the umbrella of FDI: “Direct investment is a category of cross-
border investment made by a resident in one economy (the direct investor) with 
the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct 
investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct 
investor. The motivation of the direct investor is a strategic long-term relationship 
with the direct investment enterprise to ensure a significant degree of influence by 
the direct investor in the management of the direct investment enterprise. The 
“lasting interest” is evidenced when the direct investor owns at least 10% of the 
voting power of the direct investment enterprise” (OECD, 2008). 
  
Due to the limited space and scope of the thesis, we will restrain the theoretical 
analysis of the FDI to one of the most widely used frameworks in this area, 
specifically Dunning’s eclectic paradigm. The OLI framework rests on three 
pillars (Dunning, 2000). First, ownership-specific advantages (O) which represent 
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certain assets, unique to specific firms and not available to the others. These 
ownership advantages can determine firms from one country to supply foreign 
markets. The extent to which a firm possesses and exploits the ownership 
advantages is the first determinant of the level and structure of a firm’s FDI. 
Second, there are the location-specific advantages (L), which are available to all 
types of firms, but are specific to a particular location. In this case we can refer to 
capital and labour, but also cultural, political, legal, and financial aspects of a 
certain location. The distribution of the aforementioned location-type resources 
and capabilities is not the same among different countries. Third, market 
internalization advantages may exist. Given that a firm has a set of ownership 
specific advantages, and that there are location advantages in a certain country, 
then the company may choose to internalize its activities. As long as the 
transaction and coordination costs of using external arm’s length transactions are 
low, then it will be proper for a firm to engage in FDI, rather than rely on a 
licensing contract, or another market arrangement. 
By applying the OLI paradigm as a theoretical foundation of the thesis, we have a 
basis concerning the FDI. We will further focus on the mode of entry a firm 
chooses in new environments. 
 
An extensive literature review exists on the flows of FDI towards developing 
markets worldwide. The usual proposed determinants of FDI in these countries 
are domestic economic environment, market size, infrastructure, labour cost, 
economic openness, return on capital and many others (Quazi 2007; Cavusgil et 
al. 2008). Throughout our paper we are going to look at Brazil, Russia and 
Mexico, countries that are familiar with significant foreign investments yearly. 
The high FDI inflows that take place in these countries, despite of the high levels 
of corruption, can be explained by common characteristics such as large 
population, potential customer market, fast economic growth and trade openness 
(Ranjan 2011; World Bank 2012). More specifically, geographical position and 
cheap labour cost are making Brazil a major destination for FDI. A similar 
situation is in Russia, where the abundance of oil and gas resources are attracting 
specialized investments, Russia being considered a central hub for oil and gas 
import to Europe (Ranjan, 2011). In the case of Mexico, geographical location 
together with growing integration into the production and distribution systems of 
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the US industry since the NAFTA agreement, have acted as true magnets towards 
FDI inflows (Country Commerce Mexico).    
  
 
Fig. 1 
  
2.2 Entry Modes 
  
Entry mode strategies affect the foreign subsidiaries likelihood of success and its 
probability of survival (Delios and Beamish 1999). Therefore, it is very important 
for MNE’s to identify the appropriate entry mode when investing abroad. 
Previous research points out that entry modes once established are difficult to 
change, since in many cases the associated costs would be significant (Pedersen, 
Petersen and Benito 2002). 
  
There is no consensus in the field about the relationship between the three main 
modes of entry, specifically contracts, JVs and WOSs, but in our paper we will 
adopt the perspective articulated by Hennart (2000) who classifies modes of entry 
in two main categories: contracts and equity, positioning JVs and WOSs in the 
latter one. For him, the main difference between the two consists in the method 
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chosen to remunerate input providers. In the case of equity, the business partners 
are paid ex-post, whether in the case of non-equity contracts, payments are 
specified ex-ante. Additionally, according to Brouthers and Hennart (2007), the 
establishment mode can be seen as an important variable in the case of JVs and 
WOSs. Therefore, companies have to choose between Greenfields or 
Acquisitions, each having its pros and cons. 
  
A large number of theories have been used to explain the entry mode choice 
decision. Among the most commonly applied are transaction cost analysis (TCA), 
the resource-based view, institutional theory, and Dunning’s (2000) eclectic 
framework. Throughout our paper, we are going to use Dunning’s (2000) OLI 
framework (Fig. 1) presented before, since it is a tool that combines insights from 
resource based (firm-specific), institutional (location), and transaction cost 
(internalization) theories (Brouthers and Hennart 2007). While the OLI paradigm 
section successfully assesses a firm’s capacity to invest abroad, considering also 
the location characteristics together with the internalization options, we will 
complement this with Hill et al.’s (1990) framework, which is perhaps more 
specific when it comes to entry mode choice. 
  
 According to Hill et al. (1990), entry modes are characterized by different levels 
of control, resource commitment and dissemination risk (Table 1). The level of 
control can be defined as the authority over operational and strategic decision-
making; the level of resource commitment represents the dedicated assets that 
cannot be redeployed to alternative uses without cost (loss of value); finally, the 
dissemination risk refers to the risk that firm specific advantages in know-how 
will be expropriated by a licensing or joint venture partner (Hill et al. 1990). 
  
  
Constructs       
Entry Mode Control Resource 
Commitment 
Dissemination 
Risk 
Licensing Low Low High 
Joint Ventures Medium Medium Medium 
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Wholly Owned 
Subsidiary 
High High Low 
Table 1 
  
Strategic, location and transaction variables (Hill, Kwang and Kim 1990) 
  
In order for a firm to choose the right mode of entry, several variables have to be 
considered, since they have a great impact on the choice of entry. Hill et al. (1990) 
have developed a framework that identifies three underlying constructs that 
impact the entry mode decision. These are specifically strategic, environmental 
and transaction variables. 
The main point here is that diverse strategies, location aspects and firm specific 
assets, all require varying levels of control, commitment and protection against 
dissemination risk. Considering also corruption levels when deciding for one 
entry mode or another, it is important to take into account the type of industry, 
since there may be notable differences from one sector to another. 
  
2.3 Corruption 
  
Corruption has received significant attention among economists and international 
financial institutions during the last few decades, given its implications for 
economic growth. The importance of corruption comes from the fact that it has 
the ability to influence the roots of an economy. For instance, it can erode 
property rights, restrain political institutions and threaten democracy together with 
the social, economic and political benefits that come with it. In support of the 
facts presented above, the World Bank President, James D. Wolfensohn, refers to 
corruption as a cancer, in his 1996 speech at the Annual Meetings of the World 
Bank and IMF, considering that corruption is “among the greatest obstacles to 
economic and social development” (Calhoun, 2011). 
  
Throughout the literature, scholars find different classifications for corruption. In 
this sense, Kain (2001) argues that corruption can be separated into (i) grand 
corruption, which refers to situations where the political elite exploit their power 
for economic gain; (ii) bureaucratic corruption, which refers to how appointed 
 10 
bureaucrats handle their responsibilities and their relation with their superiors 
(also known as petty corruption); (iii) legislative corruption which refers to the 
extent to which the voting behaviour of legislators can be influenced. Corruption 
may also occur in daily business life without direct intervention from public 
agents. In most instances these categories are interrelated; if the government is 
corrupt it is likely that lower instances are that too. 
  
On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) distinguish between corruption 
without theft and corruption with theft. In the first case, the official provides the 
government with the price of the good and only saves for himself the additional 
bribe, whereas in the second case, the official saves the whole payment made by 
the firm. They also distinguish between organized corruption, where the payment 
of the bribe ensures the delivery of the goods, and disorganized corruption, where 
the payment of the bribe does not ensure this. In his research, Elliot (1997) 
recognizes petty corruption, characterized by bureaucrats who accept small bribes 
in exchange for releasing permits, and grand corruption, where elected politicians 
allocate contracts or subsidies to the firm that provides them with an adequate 
bribe. 
  
There has been a strong debate in the literature regarding the usefulness of 
corruption. Therefore, there are two main currents regarding the connection 
between corruption and economic growth. One of them, states that corruption acts 
like grease to wheels, facilitating the economic growth, and helping government 
officials to make the process of project approval more efficient (Leff 1964; 
Acemoglu and Verdier 1998). For instance, in transition economies, corruption 
enables the replication of the market mechanisms that are absent in situations of 
excessive or poorly designed regulation. Firms that value time or access to goods 
more highly than others will pay the officials a bribe for such access. As a result, 
corruption in transition economies will act as grease to facilitate transactions. 
  
The second current, argues that corruption impedes economic growth, because it 
increases the cost of doing business and introduces uncertainty in the decision 
making process. The proponents of this view include Mauro (1995), Mo (2001) 
and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Wei (2000a). From this point of view, it is 
necessary for firms to devote human and financial resources in order to manage 
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bribes, although these resources could be invested more profitably in other uses. 
Additionally, as pointed out by Krueger (1993), instead of speeding up 
procedures, corrupt officials actually have an incentive to cause greater 
administrative delays in order to attract more bribes. 
  
Then, there is another important classification of corruption. Doh et al. (2003) 
argue that there is pervasive corruption (corruption that is certain and widespread) 
and arbitrary corruption (corruption that is uncertain). Pervasive corruption can be 
seen as a strong deterrent to FDI in transition economies because it creates an 
additional, known cost to investors. In contrast, arbitrary corruption does not act 
as a deterrent because it simply creates higher uncertainty in the investment, but 
this uncertainty is already there in the transition economies, since these have 
unclear rules about governing business operations. In the case of pervasive 
corruption, the firm will encounter corruption whenever it deals with government 
officials, and in the case of arbitrary corruption, the firm faces uncertainty 
regarding the request for and type of bribes and the delivery of the promised 
services (Doh et al., 2003). 
  
One of the most popular views is that corruption can be seen as a tax that 
increases costs of stakeholders. As such, Ali Al-Sadig (2009) considers that 
corruption can take various forms such as bribery, extortion, influence, fraud and 
embezzlement, but throughout its research chooses to see corruption as an 
“arrangement” that involves “a private exchange between two parties which (1) 
has an influence on the allocation of resources either immediately or in the future, 
and (2) involves the use or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private 
ends (Macrae 1982)”. 
 
In our research, we are going to include the two levels of corruption suggested by 
Doh et al. (2003), specifically pervasive and arbitrary corruption, where the first 
one increases the cost, and the second one the uncertainty level.   
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3.     Literature review on FDI and Corruption 
 
Because of globalization and the growth of the emerging economies, 
multinational enterprises confront corruption on a daily basis. As we will see in 
the following part, previous literature has demonstrated that corruption affects 
negatively FDI inflows, and that firms adjusts their strategy for entering foreign 
corrupt markets (Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). But contrary to general expectations, in 
emerging markets there are high levels of corruption, together with high FDI 
inflows. The punishment expected in their respective home countries, the 
consequences if they get caught may be fatal. Therefore, we have a theory that the 
companies find alternative ways of dealing with the corruption, namely through 
entry modes. In this sense, further on we will present a literature review related to 
FDI and corruption, and entry modes and corruption.  
  
3.1.  Emerging economies and corruption 
  
   In emerging economies the market-supporting institutions are lacking, causing a 
poorly working market. The absence of strong formal institutions in these 
countries is conspicuous (Jiang et al. 2008; Demirbag et al. 2010). In emerging 
markets, foreign investment is a rapid and unforeseen incoming cash flow that 
may surpass the speed of political and economic reform in these economies and 
causes a gap between the new laws and legal system on the one hand, and the 
reality of the local culture and people’s awareness on the other, is filled with an 
increase in corruption. Thus, from the host countries’ view, corruption is not 
considered as something criminal but rather as a sort of customary law and 
practice of maintaining congruence in their community, which contributes to their 
entrusted interests.  In this sense, corruption could be considered a necessary 
contradiction within the transitional stage towards free market or market-oriented 
economies (Sato, 2009). Sato (2009) considers this a normal indicator and 
phenomenon, rather than a failure of this kind of transitional governance, a 
consequence or side effect of a rapid transition. 
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3.2.  FDI and corruption 
  
Based on studies displaying the negative effect of corruption on economic growth, 
productivity, and investment, the logic would most likely apply to foreign 
investors as well. The impact of corruption on international business did not occur 
as a separate topic for empirical studies before the early 1990s. Earlier, corruption 
was implicitly combined with other elements in the merged index of political 
stability (Habib and Zurawicki, 2010). 
  
   Later studies of corruption and FDI have found that the relation of the two is 
negatively correlated (Javorcik and Wei, 2009; Cuervo-Cazurro, 2008, 2006; 
Lambsdorff, 2003). The increases in cost and uncertainty that corruption generates 
result in a reduction in the level of FDI coming into a country (Cuervo-Cazurro, 
2008). Corruption is generally revealed as a significant barrier to foreign direct 
investment (FDI), with a negative effect on the business environment. An 
explanation is that corruption may exploit as a tax on investments, or increase 
uncertainty about costs, thus preventing foreign direct investments (Svaleryd et al. 
2008). Another resolution to why foreign investors avoid countries with 
corruption is because it is considered wrong and it can create operational 
inefficiencies (Habib and Zurawicki, 2006). 
  
   Paradoxically, transition economies have high levels of corruption and have 
similarly received large amounts of FDI. This creates an empirical irregularity that 
seems to challenge existing theoretical arguments. One explanation to this 
challenge is that in emerging markets, the absence of regulations and institutions 
corruption enables the repetition of the market mechanisms (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008). In fact, in a business survey Søreide (2007) found that Norwegian 
companies were willing to “adjust to the local business culture” if contracts were 
lost because competitors had offered bribes. Companies that value time or access 
to commodities more highly than others will pay the officials a bribe for such 
access. As a result, corruption in transition economies will exploit as “grease” to 
enable transactions and could have a positive impact on levels of FDI inflows 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) or, in fact, might jumpstart financial development in 
developing countries (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). Other researchers support this 
by arguing that bribery may be an efficient way of circumventing regulations and 
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inefficient legal systems and may, in fact, help foreign investors to enter a market 
(Svaleryd et al. 2008).  
  
   Hines (1995) conducted a study that pointed to a negative impact of corruption on 
the FDI originating from the US after 1977 as a result of the efficiency of the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practice (FCPA). Accordingly, it was not the corruption as such 
which acted as a detriment to the US outgoing FDI but rather a perception of 
being penalized if being exposed by home country authorities. This distinction is 
still significant nowadays as it indicates why corruption is a deterrent. One 
possible explanation would be that it is not (only) the corruption as such which 
acts as a barrier nonetheless the risk of being punished if the briber is uncovered 
(Habib and Zurawicki, 2010). One of the most common claims in the international 
corruption debate is that companies repeatedly bypass anti-bribery legislation by 
using intermediaries – such as commercial agents or joint venture partners – to 
pay bribes on their behalf (Bray, 2004).   
  
 
 
3.3.  Different Ways on how Corruption Affects FDI 
  
   A stream of literature regarding FDI and corruption has focused on the impact of 
corruption in specific contexts: geographic regions, industries, host-home country 
relations, types of FDI (for example, market-seeking vs. efficiency-seeking) 
(Habib and Zurawicki, 2010). Starting out from the theory of FDI, corruption can 
have different effects on horizontal investments, which are predominantly aimed 
at sales to the local market, compared with vertical investments, which are created 
to access lower factor costs for export sales. (Svaleryd et al. 2008) An alternative 
idea is that it is not the level but rather the type of corruption that deters or 
facilitates FDI in transition economies. Corruption has a negative influence on 
FDI because it increases costs and uncertainty. However, different types of 
corruption have a different influence on FDI in transition economies (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2008). 
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3.4.  Corruption Affecting the Type of Ownership and the 
Mode of Entry 
  
   MNEs may generate internal institutional pressures when adapting to various 
institutional environments, conceivably decreasing internal regularity when 
subsidiaries adapt to local conditions that conflict with norms or rules in other 
parts of the organization. An example is the way the company is handling 
corruption. To handle such conflicting pressures companies may engage in 
strategic behavior, such as the regulation of entry modes (Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). 
In terms of managerial implications, foreign investors can either choose to stay 
away from corrupt environments or adapt accordingly. Apart from allocating the 
responsibility for bribery etc. to independent agents (Bray, 2004), foreign 
investors can benefit from different forms of partnerships with local businesses 
more skilled in dealing with corruption (Habib and Zurawicki, 2001).  
  
The more widespread corruption is the more likely MNE subsidiaries are to 
encounter such pressures to participate in corruption (Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). 
Corruption makes achieving local licenses and permits more costly for foreign 
investors. Having a local partner lowers the transaction cost. However, at the 
same time, sharing the ownership may cause leakage of technology (Javorcik and 
Wei, 2009).  
  
      Wei and Smarzynska (2000) focused on the impact of corruption in a host country 
on foreign investors' choice between a joint venture and a wholly owned 
subsidiary. They found that corruption shifts the ownership structure towards joint 
ventures. Nevertheless, the more technological sophisticated the company was, 
the more the preference moved away from joint ventures in a corrupt country 
(Wei and Smarzynska, 2000; Javorcik and Wei, 2009). As an exception, US 
investors in similar companies were found to be more reluctant to joint ventures in 
corrupt countries than investors of other nationalities. The authors speculate if this 
could be because they have a strict legislation in the US on corruption if caught 
(Wei and Smarzynska, 2000).  
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Javorcik and Wei (2009) investigated how foreign direct investment and its 
ownership structure were affected by the degree of corruption. They found that 
the likelihood of foreign investment taking place is negatively related to the 
degree of corruption in a host country. Additionally, they argue that corruption 
shifts the ownership structure towards joint ventures. The latter finding supports 
the view that corruption increases the value of using a local partner to cut through 
the bureaucratic maze. However, R&D intensive firms are found to favor sole 
ownership. 
  
   Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) focused explicitly on the telecommunications industry in 
64 emerging economies. Their analysis reveals that corruption in the telecom 
markets shifts the preference of foreign businesses away from the wholly owned 
investment projects towards joint ventures and further to non-equity forms of 
operation. Firms that enter via equity modes prefer joint ventures over wholly 
owned subsidiaries in corrupt environments, nonetheless only where arbitrariness 
is high. Arbitrariness increases the likelihood that firms entering via FDI engage 
in joint ventures to overcome the problems connected with managing a foreign 
subsidiary in a corrupt host country. Firms sometimes adapt to corruption not by 
avoiding entry altogether, but by choosing non-equity entry instead. Non-equity 
entry provides an opportunity for firms to participate in economies where 
corruption is high, while avoiding some of the costs of corruption. The results 
regarding pervasiveness suggest that this dimension of corruption represents not 
just another tax on entry, but is also an environmental threat to firms (Uhlenbruck 
et al. 2006). 
  
These studies that analyse the relationship between corruption and its impact on 
MNCs’ choice of entry mode focused mainly on Eastern Europe (Javorcik et al., 
2009) and Asia (Demirbag et al., 2010) or took a general overview based on a 
cross country composition, but only in one industry (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). We 
will compose a cross country composition focusing on Brazil, Russia and Mexico 
and consider multiple industries. 
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4. Research Objective 
  
From the literature review, we can see that corruption negatively correlates with 
FDI, nevertheless this does not seem to be relevant in emerging markets; there, 
despite the high levels of corruption, FDI inflows are increasing at amazing levels. 
The strict legislation in their respective home countries, e.g. the UK Bribery Act 
that came into force in 2011, contributes to the consequences of getting caught for 
a MNE by the home country in involvement of corruption could be severe. This 
gives us a reason to believe that since the firms present in the countries choose to 
adapt accordingly to the environment, they find alternative methods of handling 
corruption. One of the methods are entry methods in the country scoring high on 
corruption. Previous studies uncover the fact that in general, when facing high 
corruption, companies from non-high tech sectors favor a joint venture, instead of 
a wholly owned subsidiary. However, these studies are limited in number, and 
some of them focus on only one specific industry or one specific country.  
 
Consequently, we want to bring our contribution to the literature by focusing on 
multiple industries and multiple countries. We will investigate what type of entry 
modes do companies employ, when choosing to invest in emerging countries such 
as Brazil, Russia and Mexico, which are high on corruption, and are among the 
top emerging markets in terms of FDI inflows, according to CIA WorldFactbook. 
To go more in depth, our analysis will include several sectors, to better assess the 
potential differences that might exist. In particular, we will look at the legislation 
of the home countries investing in the emerging countries to see if there is a 
correlation between strict home legislation against corruption and entry modes.  
 
In the next part of the paper, we will give an introduction of how we are going to 
conduct our research, by presenting our variables and data collection methods.  
5.  Methodology 
  
In this part of the paper, we are going to present an overview of the methods used 
to conduct our research and to try to find an answer to our research question. As 
mentioned before, we will investigate the causal relationship between the entry 
mode choice of MNEs, and corruption, by focusing on several sectors from 
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Brazil, Mexico, and Russia. We believe that these countries are relevant for our 
topic, since all of them are characterized by a high level of corruption and high 
FDI inflows (Ranjan 2011), and additionally have the possibility of full ownership 
for foreign firms. Therefore, we are going to gather data regarding corruption, and 
also FDI related information, the unit of analysis being the industry sector. 
  
Corruption is by its nature a concept difficult to measure (Javorcik and Wei 2009), 
but even more so, it is a sensitive subject that could be avoided during an 
interview. Additionally, FDI related data, such as information about the form of 
the project (Equity or Non-Equity, Acquisition or Greenfield) can be found in 
online datasets. As such, we have decided to employ a quantitative approach, 
gathering our empirical data from a firm level compendium, which have been 
included in a worldwide database called PPI (World Bank’s Private Participation 
in Infrastructure Databank). 
  
For measuring the corruption level, there are a few indices available, but perhaps 
the most popular is the Transparency International Global Corruption Perception 
Index, in which countries are ranked annually by “their perceived level of 
corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys 
(Transparency International Web Site)”. Previous research has in addition to this 
index used a junction of several indicators (Javorcik et al. 2009; Slangen et al. 
2009). In concrete, Javorcik et al. (2009) employ the corruption index from the 
World Development Report, which is based on a survey undertaken by the World 
Bank, completing it with the corruption index used in Kaufmann et al. (1999) and 
a corruption perception index reached by a questionnaire. This, according to 
Javorcik et al. (2009), provides more precise results regarding different types of 
corruption.   
  
Another crucial variable for our model is represented by the technological 
sophistication of the investing firm, since it is know from the literature that 
usually, in the case of high technological sophistication, WOS are preferred, in the 
detriment of JVs (Javorcik 2006). Another variable is how “strict” the legislation 
in the home country is, referring to Wei and Smarzynska (2000) who found that 
regardless of the technological sophistication, US firms tend to choose Joint 
Ventures.  Additionally, we will control for the size of the firm and the country 
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characteristics, since both constructs could have significant influence. Regarding 
the first, larger firms have more financial resources, therefore are more likely to 
invest abroad; following the same reasoning, Kogut and Singh (1988) argue that 
in the case of high cultural distance, companies tend to rely on JVs, considering 
that a local partner could be more useful in an unfamiliar environment. We 
believe, based on the literature review, this would apply to countries with a high 
degree of uncertainty and corruption as well. Furthermore, we will also control for 
the various sectors of the economy, since we expect to find notable differences in 
this sense. All the data for each of the specific variables will be gathered from the 
PPI Database.  
 
Several additional variables will be taken into account, such as the host’s country 
GPD and GDP per capita, together with the level of corporate tax rates. High 
levels of the first two are expected to encourage FDI, meanwhile the taxes could 
act as a deterrent. Moreover, our investigation will include a time span of five 
years, from 1996 to 2011. 
 
For the econometrics part, we are going to conduct a regression analysis, and 
estimate the parameters using the SPSS software. The independent variable will 
be Corruption, and the main dependent ones will be Contract, JV and WOS. The 
dummy variables will be the ones we are going to control for, such as GDP and 
GDP per capita, technological sophistication, size of firm and several country 
characteristics. The results will then be presented using tables and graphs, so that 
the provided information can be easily understood.  
 
5. Conclusion  
Limitations, Implications and Future Research Topics 
 
Throughout our paper we are going to investigate the way MNEs choose certain 
entry modes, when operating in emerging countries with high corruption, and high 
FDI inflows.  
We will be focusing on three emerging economies which both has a high degree 
on corruption, fdi and an open legislation regarding ownership, namely Brazil, 
Russia and Mexico, but we are deliberately excluding China and India, which are 
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the most attractive FDI destinations globally (Ranjan 2011). We have done this 
because in both countries there are several limitations concerning 100% foreign 
investment, and we considered that our results could be biased. However, perhaps 
future research should analyze the BRIC countries altogether, and also other high 
profile developing economies, considering multiple sectors, and controlling for all 
the factors that might bias results. Such an approach could perhaps signal certain 
differences or similarities that might prove useful for the business community. 
 
Another potential limitation could be due to the fact that governments tend to 
support and be more interested in certain sectors and industries of the economy 
than in others. We will try to control for this factor, but still, the outcome of the 
study could be partially distorted. 
Additionally, future studies should also try to find out how the corporate culture 
of the MNEs, and its views towards corruption influence the way the firms deal 
with foreign corruption, and decide upon one entry mode or another. In the same 
sense, the nationality of the employees, which could have various perspectives 
towards “subversive methods” should be investigated. Of a particular interest 
could be the general manager that “directs” the investment of a multinational in a 
corrupted country, since his background, beliefs and habits could lead to the 
acceptance of rejection of corruption, and could also affect the choice of operation 
in that specific region . 
 
There are still many variables to be taken into account and studied, but we hope 
that our research paper will add valuable information to the previous studies 
regarding the way firms choose to operate in markets characterised by high levels 
of corruption. We also hope that our findings will heighten the attention of 
governments, investors and managers, towards corruption and its effects.  
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